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Abstract
Despite continuing criticism of public education, experimentally demonstrated and field
tested teaching methods have been ignored, rejected, and abandoned. Instead of a stable
consensus regarding best teaching practices, there seems only an unending succession of
innovations. A longstanding educational doctrine appears to underlie this anomalous state of
affairs. Termed developmentalism, it presumes "natural" ontogenesis to be optimal and it
requires experimentally demonstrated teaching practices to overcome a presumption that they
interfere with an optimal developmental trajectory. It also discourages teachers and parents from
asserting themselves with children. Instead of effective interventions, it seeks the preservation of
a postulated natural perfection. Developmentalism's rich history is expressed in a literature
extending over 400 years. Its notable exponents include Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey,
and Jean Piaget; and its most recent expressions include "developmentally appropriate practice"
and "constructivism." In the years during which it gained ascendance, developmentalism served
as a basis for rejecting harsh and inhumane teaching methods. Today it impedes efforts to hold
schools accountable for student academic achievement.
Over the past thirteen years American public schools have been subjected to an increasing
barrage of criticism. The chief object of complaint has been their continuing failure to equip
students with the academic and workplace skills needed in an era of increasing economic
competition.
Recent expressions evidence a growing public impatience. In an April 1993 statement, U.
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S. Secretary of Education Richard Riley commented: "A watered down curriculum and low
expectations for too many of our students prevent them from meeting high standards" (Riley,
1993). A September 1993 report by the National Center for Education Statistics found that 16 to
20 percent of the U. S. adults who perform at the lowest levels of reading, writing, and arithmetic
were high school graduates (Kirsch, Jungblut, Jenkins & Kolstad, 1993). In November of 1993,
the U. S. Department of Education reported that in comparison to their peers in other
industrialized countries, gifted American students rank near the bottom in math and science
achievement (Kantrowitz & Wingert, 1993). In September of 1994, the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC, 1994) disclosed that since the Nation at Risk report in 1983 there has
been little change in the achievement levels of public school students despite a 43% increase in
real dollar expenditures. Near the end of 1994, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD, 1994) described the quality of American education as a major threat to the
future economic well- being, productivity, and competitiveness of the U. S. In April of 1995,
Business Week (Mandel, Melcher, Yang & McNamee, 1995) declared that businesses find too
many job applicants unable to read, write, or do simple arithmetic and that Americans are "fed
up" with their public schools.
Berliner and Biddle (1995) and various other commentators (Bracy, 1996; Westbury,
1992) have attempted to defend the public schools' record by offering a more sympathetic
interpretation of the available evidence. However, a recent review of Berliner and Biddle
(Stedman, 1996a) and the ensuing exchange between Berliner, Biddle and Stedman (Berliner &
Biddle, 1996; Stedman, 1996b) demonstrates that reinterpretation of school and student
performance data is unlikely to convince knowledgeable observers that the ongoing criticisms of
public schooling are "manufactured" or otherwise off target.
Despite these mounting concerns, schools have largely ignored the availability of a number
of teaching methodologies that seem capable of producing the kind of achievement outcomes
demanded by the public. They are experimentally validated, field tested, and known to produce
significant improvements in learning. Instead, the schools have continued to employ a wide
variety of untested and unproven practices which are said to be "innovative" (Carnine, 1995;
Marshall, 1993). In particular, teaching practices such as mastery learning and Personalized
System of Instruction (Bloom, 1976; Guskey & Pigott, 1988; Kulik, Kulik & Bangert-Drowns,
1990), direct instruction (Becker & Carnine, 1980; White, 1987), positive reinforcement
(Lysakowski & Walberg; 1980, 1981), cues and feedback (Lysakowski & Walberg, 1982), and
the variety of similar practices called "explicit teaching" (Rosenshine, 1986), are largely ignored
despite reviews and meta- analyses strongly supportive of their effectiveness (Ellson, 1986;
Walberg, 1990, 1992). Yet methodologies such as whole language instruction (Stahl & Miller,
1989), the open classroom (Giacomia & Hedges, 1982; Hetzel, Rasher, Butcher, & Walberg,
1980; Madamba, 1981; & Peterson, 1980), inquiry learning (El- Nemr, 1980), and a variety
practices purporting to accommodate teaching to student diversity (Boykin, 1986; Dunn,
Beaudrey, & Klavas, 1989; Shipman & Shipman, 1985; Thompson, Entwisle, Alexander, &
Sundius, 1992) continue to be employed despite weak or unfavorable findings or simply a lack of
empirical trials.
Equally surprising is the observation that many of the ignored and rejected methodologies
are quite similar to those that have been found effective and are routinely used by special
educators and school psychologists (Hallahan, Kauffman, & Lloyd, 1985; Hammill & Bartel,
1990; Wang, Reynolds & Walberg, 1987). In many instances, the otherwise unused practices are
successfully implemented but only after a student has been identified as disabled.
Methods Texts and Experimental Research
A sampling of popular textbooks used in regular education teaching methods courses
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offers what may be a reason for this anomalous state of affairs. Widely used textbooks--in the
present report, elementary, middle, and secondary teaching methods texts that have been revised
repeatedly, some over thirty and forty years (Armstrong & Savage, 1994; Callahan, Clark, &
Kellough, 1992; Clark & Starr, 1991; Henson, 1993; Jacobsen, Eggen, & Kauchak, 1993; Kim &
Kellough, 1995; Lemlech, 1994; Ornstein, 1992; Sheperd & Ragan, 1992)--give little weight to
experimentally demonstrated results as a basis for identifying effective teaching practices.
Instead, they present an eclectic assortment of approaches colored by distinct distaste for
methods that are structured, teacher- directed, and result- oriented--characteristics that exemplify
the experimentally vindicated approaches to teaching. Lemlech's (1994) account is typical:
In classrooms where students are given little opportunity to
choose what they will learn, how they will learn, and the way
in which they will be evaluated for learning, there is a
greater likelihood that the classroom is structured through
intrinsic rewards, incentive programs, and normative
evaluation. As a consequence, learning will become joyless.
There is also a tendency in these classrooms to overemphasize
repetition, drill, and commercially produced dittos for
practice materials. Some believe this to be prevalent in low
socio-economic and low achieving classrooms, and as a
consequence it may the cause of negative motivation patterns.
(p. 91)
Instead of empirically grounded recommendations as to best practices, the methods texts
suggest a personalized and intuitive approach to instruction built around teacher
experience,circumstances, and sensitivity to student needs. Ornstein's (1992) advice exemplifies
this view:
In considering what is best for you, you must consider
your teaching style, your student's needs and abilities,
and your school policies. Asyou narrow your choices,
remember that approaches overlap and are not mutually
exclusive. Also remember that more than one approach
may work for you. You may borrow ideas from various
approaches and construct your own hybrid. The approach
you finally arrive at should make sense to you on an
intuitive basis. Don' let someone impose his or her
teaching style or disciplinary approach on you.
Remember, what works for one person (in the same school,
even with the same students) may not work for another
person. (p. 129)
In essence, these methods texts acknowledge research as a foundation for educational
practice but give it little weight in formulating a conclusion about the practices most likely to
produce results. Neither do they encourage the reader to rely on research as a basis judging the
quality of teaching practices. They seem to wear the mantle of science but oddly neglect its
substance and purpose.
The same emphasis on teaching shaped by innovation and sensitivity to student differences
is quite evident in the catalogues of publishers that target teachers and teacher educators. The
titles and descriptions of offerings by Heinemann (1995) and National Education Association
(1995), for example, both reflect a market preference for the new and innovative and a market
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indifference to the empirically grounded or to the tried and true.
The varied and ever-mutating body of scholarship referenced by the textbooks implies the
kind of ongoing refinement and revitalization characteristic of scientifically informed practice.
Yet their recommendations with respect to teaching do not reflect the kind of consensus that
would be expected to emerge as recent advancements are built onto established findings
(Stanovich, 1992, 1993). Empirical findings are at best an imperfect guide to practice; but as they
cumulate and converge, they do yield important clues. At the least, they reveal that certain
findings tend to repeat themselves. The impression conveyed by the present textbooks, however,
is that learning's relationship to teaching is largely idiosyncratic and unpredictable. That which is
true for one teacher, teaching one lesson, to one set of students is not a valid guide for others.
Neither do these textbooks acknowledge the unique value of experimental trials. The
distinctive value of experimental evidence is understood throughout the scientific community
(Cook & Campbell, 1979), and experimentation as a guide to effective teaching practice has been
recognized by the educational community for more than thirty years (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Yet the methods texts are silent on the matter. Here again although the fallibility of empirical
evidence must be acknowledged, it must also be said that the well conceived experiment offers
more convincing evidence of whether a teaching method works than a report offering only
description or correlation. Dismissing experimental findings on the grounds that offer only good
but not certain evidence of pedagogical effectiveness is to fallaciously make the perfect the
enemy of the good.
Given the market success of these textbooks and the teaching profession's apparent
comfort with such an orientation, it is not difficult to see how schools continue to respond to the
public call for better results with untested innovations (Carnine, 1995). Seemingly the education
community has neither a scientifically founded consensus about best practices nor a recognition
that experimental evidence would be integral to the formation of such a consensus. In the
absence of attention to experimental trials, teaching innovations lacking demonstrated
effectiveness can come into vogue on the strength of publicity and marketing only to later be
bypassed by more of the same (Armstrong, 1980; Carnine, 1993; Marshall, 1993). In truth,
continual innovation may have become a way of coping with public criticism. New practices are
incongruously piled onto the old as consultants, school boards, superintendents, and teachers
come and go (Armstrong, 1980). Criticisms that are behind the curve can be ignored because they
are no longer relevant. Criticisms of the latest innovations can be ignored because they are
premature and intolerant of innovation.
The Influence of Developmentalism
The thesis advanced in the following is that a longstanding but poorly recognized
educational doctrine underpins the neglect of experimental evidence found inmethods textbooks
and in the attempt to find more effective teaching methods. It is a doctrine that pervades teacher
education and one that disposes the teaching profession to favor certain practices and to ignore
others regardless of empirically demonstrated merit. Termed "developmentalism" (Stone, 1991,
1993a, 1994), it is a form of romantic naturalism that inspires teacher discomfort with any
practice that is deemed incompatible with natural developmental processes (Binder & Watkins,
1989). It is a view that acquired popularity as a grounds for rejecting the often harsh formalist
teaching methods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Ravitch, 1983; Riegel, 1972).
Today it poses an obscure but powerful restriction on scientifically informed educational
improvement and more broadly on teacher and parent efforts to influence the developing child.
Developmentalism's clearest present-day expressions include the "child centered" or
"progressive" teaching seen in Canadian schools (Freedman, 1993), the "progressivism" or
"Plowdenism" seen in the British Primary Schools (Alexander, Rose, & Woodhead, 1992), and
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the "developmentally appropriate practice" advocated by early childhood educators (Carta,
Schwartz, Atwater & McConnell,1991). The learner-centered teacher education favored by
National Education Association is another expression, one that is widely known and well
regarded in colleges of education (Darling-Hammond, Griffin & Wise, 1992).
Discovery learning is predicated on developmentalism (Bruner, 1966) and so is the
increasingly popular constructivism (Brooks & Brooks, 1993). Although constructivism employs
a distinctive terminology and a more credible theoretical foundation, its major precepts are
largely those advanced by John Dewey (1916/1963) at the turn of the century and discredited in
the nineteen fifties. Dewey's "progressive education" (Dewey, 1938/1963) is the best known
historic form of developmentalism and one whose present day influence is remarkably
underestimated. "Reflective thinking," "authentic learning," "hands-on" experiences, "authentic
assessment," and many other of today's best known pedagogical terms and concepts are rooted in
Dewey's adaptation of developmentalism. Other recent (but now less popular) forms of
developmentalism are the "third force" and "humanistic" psychologies on which the educational
innovations of the nineteen sixties and seventies were based (Weber, 1972).
A variety of other popular practices are less explicitly developmentalist but they share
developmentalism's premises about the goodness of the natural--a characteristic that is key to
their acceptance by the educational mainstream. Well known examples include the "whole
language" and "language experience" approaches to reading (Altwerger, Edelsky & Flores, 1987),
the closely related "emergent literacy" view of reading (Teal & Sulzby, 1987), and the "cognitive
apprenticeship" approach to instruction (Brown, Collins, and Duguid, 1989). Stahl and Miller's
(1989) discussion of whole language and language experience reading instruction highlights its
appeal as a "natural" mode of instruction: "The goal of both approaches is to bring children into
literacy in a 'natural' way [italics added], by bridging the gap between children's own language
competencies and written language" (p. 88).
Developmentalism: The Term and Its Referents
Although Stone (1991, 1993a, 1994) seems to have originated the use of
"developmentalism" in reference to the doctrine discussed herein, similar terms have been used
to denote developmentally informed educational practice. Sprinthall and Sprinthall (1987) used
the term "developmentalists" in reference to educators who base their practices on developmental
considerations. A similar term-- "philosophic-developmentalist"-- was used by Lawrence
Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer (1972) in reference to the views of John Dewey (1859-1952) and
Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Dewey's and Piaget's views were termed "interactionist" and those of
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), "maturationist." In contrast to these precedents,
developmentalism as used by Stone (1991, 1993a, 1994) refers to a broad doctrine that presumes
"natural" ontogenesis to be optimal. Such a presumption is common to both maturationist and
interactionist views of development; and it is implicit in Dewey, Piaget, Rousseau, and the others
here termed developmentalists. As the term is used here, the "ism" in developmentalism is the
uncontested assumption that the "natural" course of development, however conceived in theory,
is the optimal possibility. It is an obscure but vital form of romantic naturalism--one thoroughly
embedded in the American culture.
Stated broadly, developmentalism is the view of age- related social, emotional, and
cognitive change that regards the optimal progression to be a fragile result of native tendencies
emerging in a world congenial to their presumed wholesome nature. It emphasizes (a) the
sufficiency of a natural inclination to learning, (b) the dangers of interference with native
characteristics and proclivities, and (c) the desirability of learning experiences that emulate those
thought to occur naturally. Social, emotional, and cognitive attributes that may be the
unrecognized result of teacher and parent intervention are presumed by developmentalism to be
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manifestations of nature's normal trajectory. Man, his social contrivances, and indeed,
civilization are seen as distinct from nature; and deliberate efforts to alter the course of child
development are suspected of interfering with optimal developmental outcomes.
Developmentalism assumes that the developmental directions issuing from the child's
native tendencies and characteristics are optimal because they are a part of "nature." Although
their concepts of development differed, Rousseau, Dewey, Piaget, and all other
developmentalists share this premise. For Rousseau, nature was God's work untainted by human
influence. In his view, the optimal developmental progression was simply the emergence of
native tendencies and characteristics unfettered and unspoiled by society. By contrast, Dewey and
Piaget considered the child's tendencies and characteristics to be the product of Darwinian
evolution. Native tendencies and characteristics were desirable because they had survived the
process of natural selection. Unlike Rousseau, Dewey and Piaget held that the optimal
progression depended not only on successful maturation but on a natural process of interaction
wherein the native characteristics selected-for by evolution were enhanced by the naturally
occurring experiences to which they were fitted (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). Thus originated
Dewey's emphasis on authentic educational experience. Evolution equipped humans to learn by
solving problems, therefore learning in the context of problem solving was optimal. Although
Rousseau's development was more exclusively a matter of maturation, he too treated social and
educational influences as having the ability to either facilitate and nurture, or to corrupt and
misdirect the optimal progression to which nature was postulated to tend.

A Brief History of Developmentalism
Developmentalism's historic foundations go well beyond the writings of Rousseau, Dewey,
and Piaget. Pedagogical theorists such as Johann Bernard Basedow (1724-1790), Johann
Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Friedrich Froebel
(1782-1852), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), William James (1842-1910), and G. Stanley Hall
(1844-1924) are the best known proponents of the past 200 years. In general, their views were
premised on either the maturation-only or the maturation/environmental- interaction schemes of
development.
The ascendance of developmentalism in America may be related to an early belief about
education as a cause of madness. According to Makari (1993), Rousseau's "education naturelle"
was presaged by the writings of John Locke in 1691 and Giambattista Vico in 1709. Vico
believed that children develop through a series of immutable phases and he condemned
educational practices not in harmony with the "natural" progression. He considered abstract
Cartesian thought to be particularly harmful. Vico's supposition that that which appears to be
unnatural is apt to harmful has been echoed repeatedly even to the present day. Proponents of
"developmentally appropriate" teaching practice, for example, believe that the use of incentives
with young children are likely to be damaging.
Vico's belief was accepted within American psychiatry from its earliest years, and it
persisted in the professional literature well into the late eighteen hundreds (Makari, 1993). The
public and professional acceptance of such thinking as enlightened and informed clearly would
have lent credibility to the criticisms of formalist teaching methods voiced by Dewey, James, and
others. Also it would have bolstered the acceptance of the developmentalist schooling methods
imported from Europe throughout the era.
Rousseau and European Developmentalists
Rousseau argued that all that comes from the hand of the Creator must be good; and in
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doing so, he substituted a doctrine of original goodness for that of original sin. He believed that
formal schooling was not only unnecessary (because children tend naturally to learn) but that it
harms students by violating their natural propensities (Green, 1955). Classically premised on a
romanticist faith in nature, Rousseau's Emile was a critique of educational practice in his day.
Hegel embellished Rousseau's theme and described child development as a process of
unfoldment toward a state of natural perfection (Bigge & Hunt, 1962). Basedow, Pestalozzi, and
Froebel each articulated their unique vision of schooling based on Rousseau's and Hegel's
concepts (Rusk, 1965). In each case, their conceptual framework required schooling to be fitted
to the child in the interest of preserving the goodness inherent in nature, and in each case they
were received by the European public as a welcome alternative to the often harsh teaching
methods of the day. Teachers of the era typically were retired drill sergeants and their methods
were adaptations of military training (Riegel, 1972).
Herbert Spencer and William James
Spencer and James similarly argued that education must be fitted to the child but their
ideas were premised on an evolutionary model of nature (Cremin, 1964). The vision of natural
perfection suggested by evolutionary theory differed from that of Rousseau but the ideal of
education in harmony with natural perfection again was perpetuated. Optimal educational results
were those that arose from fulfillment of nature's inherent order--an order shaped by the workings
of evolution. Although Spencer and James both relied on an evolutionary premise, their thinking
diverged as to the relationship between the natural order and desirable educational outcomes.
Spencer conceived of education as subordinate to and, ideally, accommodated to the broader
evolutionary process. He held that men were "infinitely more creatures of history than its
creators" (Cremin, 1964, p. 93). Thus educational practice fitted to nature's dictates was the
arrangement most conducive to optimal enhancement of the species. In contrast, James
conceived of the human mind as having an active role in shaping the natural order and; more than
Spencer, Rousseau, or Dewey, he believed that teachers should instill good (i.e., adaptive) habits.
James differed in other important ways from Dewey and other developmentalists. In
contrast to Dewey, James conceived of educational outcomes as specific observable behavior
change, not as a broad gaged and intangible intellectual growth. Also in contrast to Dewey and
most other developmentalists, James believed that learned habits could serve to inhibit or
overcome unfavorable natural tendencies. Thus he was he was not especially critical of recitation
and the older "formalist" educational methods, and neither did he expect all learning to be
motivated by a genuine personal interest. In James's words, the belief that learning should be
motivated only by interest was "soft pedagogy" (James, 1899/1924, p. 109).
As to the relationship between human development and learning, James held that evolution
had endowed humans with naturally "ripening" instincts and native interests to which successful
teaching should be fitted. Unlike Dewey and other developmentally informed theorists, however,
he did not insist on adherence to nature's ripening process or on an approximation of nature's
interaction patterns as the optimal means of educating. Rather James' Talks to Teachers
(1899/1924) offered practical recommendations that could be implemented largely without
reference to developmental considerations. Thus in spite of his attention to human development
as an educational consideration, James, unlike Dewey, did not greatly contribute to the restrictive
orthodoxy that is developmentalism.
G. Stanley Hall and Arnold Gesell
G. Stanley Hall may have been the individual most responsible for infusing the American
educational tradition with the maturation-only version of developmentalism (Strickland &
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Burgess, 1965). Hall believed that quality teaching was that which was fitted to what he termed a
"saltatory" pattern of development--a pattern he believed to have been dictated by human
evolutionary history (Hall, 1907).
Hall's views are among the most explicitly developmentalist in the history of American
education; and although his "general psychonomic law" (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) was
eventually rejected, his concept of improving the educational process through the study of child
development became a mainstay educational orthodoxy (McCullers, 1969). In his essay "The
Ideal School as Based on Child Study," Hall argued that contrary to accepted Western
educational practice, the school should be fitted to the child rather than the child fitted to the
school. Teachers, he believed,
. . . should strive first of all to keep out of nature's
way, and to prevent harm, and should merit the proud
title of defenders of the rights and happiness of
children. They should feel profoundly that childhood,
as it comes fresh from the hand of God, is not corrupt,
but illustrates the survival of the most consummate
thing in the world; they should be convinced that there
is nothing else so worthy of love, reverence, and
service as the body and soul of the growing child.
(cited in Cremin, 1964, p. 103).
In his definitive account of progressive education, Cremin (1964, p. 104) argues that the
popularization of Hall's "pediocentric" view was "truly Copernician" because it shifted the
"burden of proof" for learning from the student to the school. Coming at a time when compulsory
education was becoming widespread, its impact on American education was enormous and
continues to be felt.
The aim of improving the educational process through child study was further popularized
by Hall's student Arnold Gesell. Although not widely read today, Gesell's developmental
concepts are consistent with popularly held views of early childhood development (cited in Bigge
& Hunt, 1962):
As with a plant, so with a child. His mind grows by
natural stages. A child creeps before he walks, sits
before he stands, cries before he laughs, babbles before
he talks, draws a circle before he draws a square, lies
before he tells the truth, and is selfish before he is
altruistic. Such sequences are part of the order of
Nature. . . . Every child, therefore, has a unique
pattern of growth, but that pattern is a variant of a
basic ground plan. (p. 166)
John Dewey and Progressive Education
John Dewey is another developmentalist who did not rely on a formally stated
developmental sequence. Instead, Dewey believed that evolution had equipped man with
characteristics fitted to certain types of naturally occurring experiences and that the learning that
emerges as the individual encounters these experiences is optimal. Quality teaching was,
therefore, the practice of fitting educational experiences to the emerging characteristics and
proclivities of the child for the purpose of optimizing "growth." Optimal development was both
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driven by maturation and nurtured by experience. In contrast to Rousseau, Dewey did not
consider maturation sufficient to guide the process. Instead, he was frequently critical of
progressive educators who followed Rousseau's maturational precepts, referring to their " . . .
idealizing of childhood [as] . . . lazy indulgence" (cited in Axtelle & Burnette, 1970, p. 260).
Also contrary to popular belief, Dewey conceived of school as a structured experience in
which teachers would ingeniously arrange student encounters with personally meaningful
problems--problems which, if well chosen, would instigate self-directed learning experiences
(Dewey, 1916/1963). The teacher's actions, however, were intended as a means of facilitating or
enhancing a spontaneous learning process, not as a means of unnaturally or artificially inducing a
preconceived outcome. In Dewey's words, the only proper aim of education is "growth" (Dewey,
1916/1963):
Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is
all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The
criterion of the value of school education is the extent
in which it creates a desire for continued growth and
supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.
(p. 53)
Dewey argued that the right sort of experience would instigate "reflective" thinking and
thereby move the student toward a meaningful and individually defined form of knowing. The
problem solving experience was, in his view, nature's way of teaching--the way in which the
species had been equipped for learning by virtue of natural selection. Dewey's prescriptions for
teaching were designed to emulate nature's process.
Because he believed that true understanding was personalized, Dewey held that
educational aims could not be dictated by any agent external to the student (Dewey, 1916/1963,
1938/1963; Feldman, 1934/1968). For this reason, Dewey's concepts severely limited the ability
of teachers to insure that students acquire any preconceived understanding or knowledge.
Education was a process intended to enhance the student's reflective powers. That subject-matter
which a student learned incidental to the educational process was the only important or expected
kind of formal educational achievement--a view clearly at odds with traditional expectations for
schooling and with the concept of teacher accountability for specific academic accomplishments.
An individual's familiarity with the knowledge and insights gleaned by intellectual forebearers
was of secondary importance in Dewey's thinking.
Dewey's departure from traditional expectations for schooling was tied to his reliance on
an evolutionary model of nature (Boydston, 1970). He believed that progressive schooling would
produce varied outcomes; that the outcomes most advantageous to society would be selected for;
and that society would be bettered by the process. Although he opposed preconceived outcomes
as the aim of schooling, his faith in human rationality led him to expect that students would
arrive at commonly held truths as a result of their personal explorations.
A similarly founded departure from conventional expectations for schooling--Dewey's
emphasis on student interest as the sole legitimate source of student motivation- -led to practical
difficulties with his approach. Because student interests might be far removed from conventional
academic pursuits, the time, effort, and resources necessary to elicit their emergence was destined
to collide with economic reality. The cost-effectiveness of schooling was not a major
consideration in Dewey's time. Neither was the availability of meaningful occupational
opportunities for students whose natural thirst for learning was significantly delayed. Thus in
spite of his pragmatic orientation, neither Dewey nor his followers seemed to appreciate the
pedagogic and economic inefficiencies that would result as growing children became immersed
in a world increasingly dominated by competing attractions.
As to reliance on formal knowledge of human development, Dewey called for teachers to
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be guided by the emergence of the individual student but to be informed by known
developmental considerations (1916/1963):
The method of [knowing and learning exhibited by an
individual student] . . . will vary from that of another
(and properly vary) as his original instinctive
capacities vary, as his past experiences and his
preferences vary. Those who have already studied these
matters are in possession of information which will help
teachers in understanding the responses different pupils
make, and help them in guiding these responses to
greater efficiency. Child-study, psychology, and a
knowledge of the social environment supplement the
personal acquaintance gained by the teacher. But
methods remain the personal concern, approach, and
attack of an individual, and no catalogue can ever
exhaust their diversity of form and tint. (p. 173)
In essence, the student's "needs" were to guide the selection and sequencing of educational
experiences. Accordingly, Dewey's curriculum was comprised of the subject matter and
experiences that fit the unique pursuits of the individual. Knowledge of formal subject matter
was purely incidental to the educational process (Dewey, 1938/1963).
The fact of Dewey's long and prestigious career combined with the extensive influence of
the progressive education movement resulted in Dewey's principles and its inherent
developmentalism becoming a very potent educational orthodoxy. Cremin (1964) notes that by
the late nineteen forties and early fifties, the language and concepts of progressive education
were no longer thought of as representing a particular educational view. Rather they were simply
considered good and sensible educational practice. For a period of fifty or so years following
World War I, both the U. S. Office of Education and the National Education Association
disseminated educational recommendations based on progressive principles as "best practices."
Today, teaching practices inspired by Dewey's concepts continue to attract adherents despite
discouraging empirical findings. The attempt to improve student achievement by matching
teaching styles with learning styles and investigations of attribute- treatment interactions are
examples of research that fail to support Dewey's recommendations for teaching (Slavin, 1991).
Within teacher education, progressivists were extremely influential. William Heard
Kilpatrick held the senior chair in social foundations of education at Teachers College, Columbia
University from 1918 to 1938. During that time he is said to have taught 35,000 teachers
(Cremin, 1964). Thus even though progressive education per se eventually fell into disrepute, its
concepts and jargon were so thoroughly established as "conventional wisdom" that the
reasonableness and intuitive appeal of all subsequent educational theorizing was largely
governed by its compatibility with progressive concepts--concepts that for the most part
embodied one or another version of developmentalism.
Neoprogressive Theorists
Subsequent to progressive education's demise in the late nineteen fifties, a number of
neoprogressive psychological theories, all possessing a strong developmentalist bent, gained
widespread popularity within the teaching profession (Weber, 1972). Exemplars include
Lawrence Frank, Daniel Prescott, Carl Rogers, Arthur Combs, Abraham Maslow, A. S. Neill,
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and Erik Erickson--all of whom viewed central aim of education as a broad gauged personal
development. Although their theoretical foundations and emphases diverged from those of
progressive education, (for example, the liberation of human potential, the enhancement of
self-esteem, the achievement of self-actualization, etc.), their recommendations for teachers were
plainly congruent with progressive education's focus on facilitation of naturally developing
tendencies and processes. Other theorists emphasized narrower facets of development but they
too were entirely compatible with developmentalism and progressive education (Weber, 1972).
These include Paul Torrence who focused on the development of intellectual creativity and
Lawrence Kohlberg who articulated a moral development progression based on Piaget's general
framework.
Of particular relevance to present day educational practice are the neoprogressive accounts
of cognitive development that became popular in the late nineteen sixties and early seventies.
Jerome Bruner and, especially, Jean Piaget are the best known exemplars in this area; and both
are essentially compatible with Dewey, particularly in their emphasis of a natural, i.e., personal
discovery, type of learning experience.
Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky
As earlier noted, Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) identified both Piaget and Dewey as
exponents of "philosophic- developmentalism"--a view that holds intellectual growth to be the
only defensible aim of education. Piaget's theory was grounded in his extensive observations of
his three children and in a host of more systematic investigations undertaken subsequently. By
training a biologist, Piaget described what seemed to be a biologically shaped sequence of
person/ environment interaction--one he believed necessary to the emergence of individual
intelligence. Thus, in contrast to the commonsensical and anecdotal accounts of intellectual
development offered by Dewey, Piaget's work provided educators an elaborate theoretical edifice
based on legitimate scientific observation.
The Russian psychologist Vygotsky (1987), a contemporary of Piaget, similarly conceived
of a biologically shaped developmental progression but with an important differences in
emphasis. In contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky argued that learning as a result of sociocultural
experiences played a far greater role in the emergence of mature thinking and behavior. The
influence of experience on behavior, however, was limited by a biologically governed zone of
proximal development. Of the two theorists, Piaget was far better known and thus exerted far
greater influence on educational practice.
Given the credibility of his findings, Piaget's educational recommendations were taken as
substantially more authoritative and convincing than those of Rousseau, Dewey, and the others.
Yet, despite its merits, Piaget's theorizing did not escape the preconceptions of its predecessors.
As had Dewey and Rousseau, Piaget surveyed that which he took to be the naturally occurring
developmental progression and presumed it optimal. Thus his conclusions--ones buttressed by
impressive theoretical and empirical refinements-- conferred a predictable and welcome
affirmation of developmentalist beliefs.
Piaget's educational recommendations were intended to preserve "natural" experiences and
to facilitate that which is unique to the individual. According to Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) they
include:
. . . (1) attention to the child's mode or style of
thought, i.e., stage; (2) match of stimulation to that
stage, e.g., exposure to modes of reasoning one stage
above the child's own; (3) arousal, among children, of
genuine cognitive and social conflict and disagreement
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about problematic situations (in contrast to traditional
education which has stressed adult "right answers" and
has reinforced "behaving well"); and (4) exposure to
stimuli toward which the child can be active, in which
assimilatory response to the stimulus-situation is
associated with "natural" feedback. (p. 462 )
Although the empirical underpinnings of Piaget's framework have been undermined by
subsequent research (Siegler, 1991) and his theory significantly revised (Case, 1991), Piaget's
thinking remains highly influential with mainstream educators. Its recent educational expression
is the increasingly well known "constructivism" (Brooks & Brooks, 1993); and as with virtually
all popular educational doctrines, its acceptance by the educational mainstream reflects its
compatibility with Dewey and developmentalism. Overton (1972) acknowledges the mutually
supportive relationship between Piagetian developmental concepts and Dewey. In essence,
Dewey enabled popularization of Piaget, and Piaget has provided a seemingly unassailable
rationale for Dewey's educational prescriptions:
. . . Piaget's functional position contributes
primarily to educational foundations and methods. The
implications of his major emphasis upon activity echo
progressive education's assertions of intrinsic
motivation, self-direction, and freedom of the learner.
The detailed analysis of the nature of the activities
involved in adaptation stresses the significance of
discovery-oriented methods in which the teacher actively
participates by presenting appropriate materials and
setting appropriate problems over methods of rote drill,
training, or enriched environments. Above all, there is
the point shared with progressive education that
learning and development occur through the experience of
the child's actively confronting his social and physical
world. (Overton, 1972, p. 113-114)
Thus the theoretical and empirical expressions of present day (mainly Piagetian)
developmentalism may not be Dewey's but its conclusions about educational practice are largely
the same (Reschly & Sabers, 1974).
Although today viewed principally as guide to teaching at the primary school level,
developmentalism serves as a conceptual foundation for educational practice at all levels (Clark
& Starr, 1991; Sprinthall & Sprinthall, 1987; Squire, 1972; Wlodkowski, 1986). At the preschool
and K-3 levels, the "developmentally appropriate instruction" concept has so thoroughly
penetrated educational thinking that it is included in the "America 2000" statement of national
educational goals (U.S. Department of Education [USDOE], 1991); it is acknowledged in the
school reform principles formulated by business leaders (Committee for Economic Development,
1991); and it is explicitly cited in school reform legislation (Kentucky Education Reform Act,
1990; Stone, 1993).
Developmentalism's Restrictions on Teaching and Parenting
Developmentalism's effect on educational reform must be understood in the context of its
influence on teaching, parenting, and socialization as a whole. As the now popular African
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proverb suggests, "it takes a village to raise a child," thus the influence developmentalism's
strictures and recommendations on the actions of both parents and teachers are critical to
schooling outcomes.
In general, developmentalist guidance has encouraged parents and teachers to be less
assertive and to afford children greater freedom. In particular, it has encouraged lessened parent
insistence on study and effort in school and on mature and responsible behavior generally.
Parents are given to believe that in a developmentally accommodative world, frustration and
delayed gratification are to be minimized while immediate success and satisfaction are to be
maximized. For example, an NEA publication by Wlodkowski (1986), discourages teachers'
from insisting on results:
We need to look more at the process and performance of
our students and less at the more narrow and selfdefeating emphasis of product or acquisition. If a
student is responding with enthusiasm and interest,
she/he will probably learn, but often without a neat,
continuous, daily progress line. To lose our students'
excitement and involvement for lack of immediate
learning is not only a waste of effort but also a danger
to the ultimate goal of any teacher--a student who is on
the road to becoming a lifelong learner. (p. 16)
The National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) is more specific.
Its policy statement on "developmentally appropriate practice" identifies that the following
actions to be inappropriate (Bredekamp, 1988):
The teacher's role is to correct errors and make sure
the child knows the right answer in all subject areas.
Teachers reward children for correct answers with
stickers or privileges, praise them in front of the
group, and hold them up as examples. (p. 76)
Broadly speaking, developmentalism and its restrictions on teaching practice argue against
intervention and, instead, favor the kind of premissiveness found in the child-rearing
recommendations of Dr. Benjamin Spock (1976) and others (Brazelton, 1974; Gessell & Ilg,
1943; Warner & Rosenberg, 1976). In truth, Spock, et al and the educational developmentalists
rely on many of the same theoretical foundations.
Developmentalism suggests that both teacher and parent expectations for behavior or
achievement must be subordinated to concerns about optimal development. Rather than seek to
shape the child to social or academic norms, developmentally informed teachers and parents are
deemed responsible for affording experiences and opportunities that are compatible with the
child's current proclivities. That such experiences will result in effort and achievement
commensurate with individual potential is simply taken for granted. Clark and Starr (1991, p.37)
exemplify this view in their textbook on secondary and middle school teaching methods:
"Because learning is developmental, it follows that one learns better when one is ready to learn."
Bigge and Hunt's (1962, p. 377) text is more explicit: "A young person is ready to learn
something when he has achieved sufficient physiological maturation and experiential background
so that he not only can learn but wants to."
Whatever the measurable impact of developmentally informed teaching and parenting on
the course of child development (a remarkably little examined topic), its immediate impact on
teacher and parent attempts to instruct and discipline are entirely foreseeable. Developmentalism
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gives rise to a disabling hesitancy and uncertainty about how or whether adults should attempt to
influence children. It strongly suggests the possibility of harm, but it offers no clear guidance as
to a safe and effective course of action. It requires an estimation of a child's developmental status
as a prerequisite to action yet it offers no workable means of ascertaining that status.
The requirement of correctly inferring individual development presents a substantial
obstacle to the application of developmental theory. The prototypic studies of human
development by Gessell (1940, 1943, 1946), Gesell, Ilg, and Ames (1956), and McGraw
(1945/1969) tracked physical and motor development--both low inference constructs. The
indicators of development--height, weight, number of teeth, number of steps, etc.--were visible
and readily quantifiable. By contrast, the phases of social, emotional, and cognitive development
to which developmentally appropriate teaching and parenting must be fitted are high inference
constructs, i.e., ones said to be manifested by complex patterns of behavior. The inherent
observational problem is evident in Piaget's concept of intelligence (Furth & Wachs, 1975):
For Piaget, intelligence is constructive and creative;
in fact, development of intelligence is but the gradual
creation of new mechanisms of thinking. It is creation
because it is not the discovery or the copy of anything
that is physically present. Classes and probability
cannot be found in the physical world. They are
concepts constructed creatively by human intelligence
and cannot be handed down by means of language or other
symbols. (pp. 25-26)
To add to the imprecision and uncertainty of the required inference, Piaget's theory holds
that the relationship between current behavior and developmental status is neither fixed nor
self-evident and that the underlying developmental progression is characterized by spurts, lulls,
and uneven dispersion across the various behavioral, emotional, and intellectual domains. Again
in reference to Piaget (Furth & Wachs, 1975):
This variability takes three forms, each of which is
contrary to a normative ideal. First, different
individuals differ on the same task and much more than
an IQ mentality would have us believe. . . . A second
type of variability is found within a certain individual
(intraindividual variability) as he performs on a
variety of different tasks [tasks requiring the same
underlying intellectual capability]. . . . A third type
of variability is observed both within the same
individual and on the same task. In other words, the
performance of a child fluctuates from day to day--an
entirely normal phenomenon that all of us experience. .
. . Recognition and acceptance of this variability is
particularly important in the case of mechanisms of
thinking which develop gradually and almost
imperceptibly [italics added]. (pp. 28-29)
In addition to their ambiguity, estimates of developmental status are inherently
conservative and restrictive of adult action. Conceptually, current levels of intellectual
performance, effort, maturity, achievement, and other indicators can understate but not exceed
present levels of development. For example, a child whose reasoning is concrete operational may

14 of 32

exhibit skills indicative of the earlier preoperational level but they would never misleadingly
exhibit skills appropriate to the more mature formal operations level. Thus assessments of
development based on a child's current behavior may underestimate but not overestimate present
developmental status.
Given that developmentally appropriate teaching and parenting must be fitted to the child's
current developmental status, and given that efforts to exhort or otherwise induce advancement
beyond the child's developmentally governed potentialities are considered risky at best, teachers
and parents are given to understand that expecting too little is a much better choice than
expecting too much. From a developmentalist perspective, if opportunity and conditions
conducive to developmental advancement have been maximized, the developmentally guided
teacher or parent has done all that can safely be done.
In effect, developmentalism discourages teachers and parents from asserting expectations
or otherwise acting to induce more mature behavior. Even in the face of noticeable deficiencies
or problematic conduct, the developmentally appropriate course of action is that which is
congenial to the child's apparent developmental status, i.e., his or her present behavior and
inclinations. Continuing lack of advancement in spite of suitable facilitating conditions is taken
to reflect delayed emergence of developmentally governed potentialities, not ineffective teaching
or parenting.
Personal, Social, and Cultural Implications
The implications of such a perspective are far-reaching and they may be relevant to the
well known concerns about the waning influence of homes and schools. In a world that affords
few immediate incentives for responsible and constructive behavior, children whose teachers and
parents are captivated by developmentalism may be significantly disadvantaged: They are too
little influenced by those adults who have the greatest interest in their well being. To the extent
that teachers, parents, and other socially ordained influences are withheld, "default
contingencies" (John Eshleman, personal communication, February 26, 1993)-- i.e., influences
arranged by peers, by the entertainment and recreation industries, etc.--are empowered.
Not only does developmentalism appear to undermine teacher and parent assertiveness, the
view of children inherent in developmentalism may be negatively linked to the "growth" of
maturity, character, and a sense of personal responsibility. Rather than encouraging parents to
treat children and youth as individuals responsible for their own behavior, developmentalism
encourages tolerance and acceptance of immaturity, irresponsibility, and failure. And given the
belief that mature and responsible behavior simply emerges if properly facilitated, the child who
fails to exhibit expected social and academic progress is excused as a victim of adverse
circumstances--a rationale for individual shortcomings that has become a cultural archetype
(Birnbaum, 1991).
The influence of developmentalism and its philosophic foundation, romantic naturalism,
may extend far beyond teaching and parenting practices. For example, the growth of so called
"anti-science" (Holton, 1993; Kurtz, 1993) and of certain forms of environmentalism seem to be
linked to the same romantic assumptions about the wholesomeness of nature that are integral to
developmentalism. Over a 75 year period developmentalism has been a prominent feature of
educational practice, and from this venue, it has had opportunity to thoroughly infuse the
American culture. The degree to which popular thought in America may have been influenced by
romanticist leanings within the public schools, however, is well beyond the present analysis.
Implications for Schoolwork
Learning of the kind sought by schools inevitably requires very substantial commitments
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of student time and effort (Tomlinson, 1992). Developmentalism, however, discourages teachers
from any attempt to directly induce it. Instead, developmentalism requires that teachers endeavor
to produce "learning in ways that are stimulating yet minimally obtrusive, challenging yet
requiring only comfortable levels of exertion" (Stone, 1994, p. 65). An anomaly becomes
apparent (Stone, 1994):
. . . schools [are encouraged] to spare neither effort
nor resources in fitting instruction to students while
expecting little from them in return. Student
inattention and apathy are met with herculean efforts to
stimulate interest and enthusiasm. Deficient outcomes
are countered by reducing expectations to the level of
whatever the student seems willing to do. Even the
practice of [motivating students by] affording . . .
accurate feedback about accomplishments is deemed
questionable because of its purported detrimental effect
on intrinsic motivation and self esteem.
. . . recurrent failure to attain even minimal
achievement is accepted as lamentable but unavoidable
and treated accordingly. In short, developmentalism
requires only the teacher to work, not the student. (p.
62)
In essence, developmentalism leads to schools in which attendance is compulsory but
study is not. Students are expected to make an effort only if they feel interested and enthused.
Study is expected to be more like fun than work. If students waste time and educational
opportunity because they find schoolwork boring, their behavior is not merely tolerated, it is
understood and excused as the product of insufficiently stimulating instruction, i.e., instruction
that fails to facilitate the emergence of the postulated ideal.
In the end, teachers are burdened with an unattainable expectation. They, their employers,
and the public are encouraged to believe that if a teacher is sufficiently creative and ingenious in
harnessing each individual student's potentialities, expected learning outcomes will emerge in a
way that the student will experience as spontaneous, natural, and comfortable. It is an ideal
founded wholly on developmentalist supposition but it has come to define good teaching.
Developmentalism's ideal of taking the work out of schoolwork may be responsible not
only for poor work habits and attitudes beyond the classroom--a problem widely noted by
employers (Mandel, Melcher, Yang & McNamee, 1995; Survey, 1991). So long as study and
effort are expected only if the student feels so inclined, the self discipline necessary to putting
school "work before pleasure" is largely omitted from the academic regimen. Instead of a work
ethic, students are given to expect significant accomplishments with minimal effort (Shine,
1993).
Educationally Appropriate Practice
A vital distinction must be drawn between developmentally appropriate instruction and
educationally appropriate instruction, i.e., those teaching practices that accommodate teaching to
the learner without regard to the hypothetical constraints posed by developmental theory.
Developmentally appropriate instruction (a.k.a. developmentally appropriate practice) seeks to
optimize the development of the "whole child" (Johnson & Johnson, 1992) irrespective of
academic norms. It is a "learner centered" (a.k.a. "student centered" or "child centered") approach
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to teaching (Darling- Hammond, Griffin and Wise, 1992) meaning that the teaching process is
constrained by developmental considerations but the product is open ended. It is an approach that
rejects both expectations for accomplishment based on curricular benchmarks or peer referenced
norms as well as any "artificial" means of insuring that they materialize.
In contrast, "educationally appropriate" instruction (Stone, 1994) seeks to meet recognized
standards and to otherwise maximize academic achievement. Both developmentally appropriate
and educationally appropriate instruction rely on present levels of demonstrated performance as a
starting point for instruction and both seek to optimize intellectual advancement. Educationally
appropriate teaching (or practice), however, does not treat present performance as a marker for a
child's developmental limits. It is "learning centered" in the sense that observed performance, not
presumed developmental limitations, guides academic advancement. Although sensitive to
student comfort with teaching practice, educationally appropriate practice holds achievement, not
developmental suitability, to be its top priority and neither does it presume high expectations or
teacher insistence on effort to be developmentally hazardous.
In conclusion, developmentalism appears to discourage teacher and parent intervention
while simultaneously promoting the belief that academic achievement and responsible behavior
will spontaneously emerge if only given time and facilitating conditions. Contrary to
developmentalist expectations, however, it may be that awaiting the emergence of wholesome
behavior is an open invitation to default contingencies and the growth of unfavorable
habits--ones that might have been precluded by the acquisition of appropriate patterns. By the
time the realities of such deficits and/or inappropriate conduct make the need for action
inarguable, remediation is likely to be more difficult. Well ingrained patterns of faulty behavior
must first be eliminated before constructive alternatives can be established--a situation all too
familiar to special educators and school psychologists.
The Developmentalist Neglect of Experimentally Vindicated Teaching Practices
Developmentalism influences teacher acceptance of experimentally demonstrated teaching
practices in much the same way it impacts teaching and parenting generally. It argues against
intervention on the grounds that it is likely to detract from the more optimal outcome that
presumably will emerge when natural developmental processes are permitted to run their course.
Some Neglected Methodologies
Over the last thirty years, a variety of experimentally vindicated teaching methods have
been developed and disseminated only to be ignored or discarded in favor of less well tested
practices that better fit developmental thinking. Mastery learning and Personalized System of
Instruction may be the best known examples (Kulik, Kulik, & Bangert-Drowns, 1990). Direct
Instruction (Becker & Carnine, 1980)--also known as DISTAR (Kim, Berger, & Kratochvil,
1972) and as "systematic instruction" (Slavin, 1994)--is another. Direct Instruction is little used
despite having been as thoroughly validated and field tested as any methodology in the history of
education (Watkins, 1988). These and a large group of structured and sequenced teaching
methodologies termed "explicit teaching" (Rosenshine, 1986) are among the most clear instances
of experimentally supported approaches to teaching that have failed to gain widespread
acceptance and/or have been abandoned.
Programmed instruction (Skinner, 1958) is another example of an abandoned methodology
and one that uniquely appears to demonstrate how developmentalism's hold on the teaching
profession influences teaching practices in public schools. Despite its initial acceptance and
evident promise, K-12 educators rejected programmed instruction in favor of less structured,
more naturalistic, "real-world," "hands-on" approaches (Skinner, 1986). However, among
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educators less influenced by developmentalism, i.e., private sector business and industrial
trainers, military trainers, designers of computer-based instruction, etc., it remained well
established (Ellson, 1986; Vargas & Vargas, 1992).
Many of the experimentally validated methodologies are behavioral because behavioral
approaches to teaching and learning are derived from the experimental analysis of behavior.
However, mastery learning (Bloom, 1976) and the "explicit teaching" methodologies discussed
by Rosenshine (1986) are not behavioral and the same can be said for most of the "productive"
methodologies discussed by Ellson (1986) and Walberg (1990, 1992). Ellson (1986) listed
seventy-five studies of teaching methods all of which report learning effects that are at least twice
as great as control comparisons. Most of these methods were popular at one time but none are in
widespread use today. Walberg (1990, 1992) summarized the results of nearly 8000 studies that
point to the efficacy of a brief list of powerful and teacher- alterable classroom interventions,
most of which are supported by experimental evidence. High expectations for effort and
achievement is one, the use of incentives is another. In general, the neglected methodologies
identified by Walberg and Ellson are structured and teacher directed; they aim to instill
preconceived academic and intellectual outcomes; and most of them employ practice, feedback,
and incentives.
Developmentally Inspired Concerns, Reservations, and Objections
Teaching methods textbooks and other sources of recommendations about teaching
practice seem to sanction the disuse of experimentally vindicated methodologies either by giving
them little or no attention or by discussing them in the context of various concerns, objections,
and reservations (Jacobsen, Eggen, & Kauchak, 1993; Ornstein, 1992; Wlodkowski, 1986).
These remarks are especially noticeable when contrasted to the uncritical treatment given
developmentally compatible methodologies. Typical cautions and criticisms involve claims that
the experimentally vindicated methods are insufficiently individualized (Armstrong, 1980), too
artificial and mechanical (Bailey, 1991), excessively reliant on extrinsic motivation (Kohn,
1993a, 1993b), suited only to lower forms of learning (Ornstein, 1992), or simply boring
(Henson, 1993; Lemlech, 1994). Virtually all of these reservations and objections are premised
on a developmentalist view of learning.
Developmentalists hold that adherence to that which is developmentally appropriate is
more important than educational achievement thus they favor educational experiences that are
well accepted by students over those that are known to produce results. In the developmentalist
view, teachers should seek methods that produce results but they should select them only from
among those methods that maximize student satisfaction. Judged by priorities so ordered,
experimentally vindicated teaching methodologies are suspect at best because they are built
around the notion that learning is the primary consideration. If the authors of methods textbooks
were to suggest that teachers should prefer methodologies that have been experimentally
vindicated, they would be in disagreement with developmentalist doctrine, i.e., with the view that
student satisfaction is primary and learning secondary. The same consideration applies to teacher
expectations for student effort and achievement. Developmentalism suggests that teachers should
expect a commitment to schoolwork that is commensurate with the student's lifestyle and
developmentally determined inclinations, not with external and artificial requirements that are
based on arbitrary or socially derived academic standards.
In effect, developmentalism requires experimentally vindicated practices not only to be
attractive, interesting, and engaging, it obliges them to overcome the belief that they are likely to
be risky or harmful, i.e. that they interfere in unknown or unsuspected ways with a virtually
boundless range of developmental considerations (Elkind, 1981). The test of usefulness to which
demonstrably effective interventions are subjected is not one of observed cost and benefit
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compared to the observed cost and benefit of an existing alternative, it is one that entails
suspected hidden cost versus the perfection that hypothetically emerges in the absence of human
interference.
For example, when "whole language" proponents express concern about skill-sequence
approaches to reading (Goodman & Goodman, 1979), they worry that the interest in reading that
otherwise naturally emerges might be lessened. Criticisms of drill, corrective feedback, and the
use of incentives are typically founded on the same argument. If, however, nature is permitted the
opportunity (i.e., a "developmentally appropriate" opportunity) to work its effects,
developmentalists assume that the expected skills and interest will emerge and without exposure
to the hazards inherent in intervention (Clark & Starr, 1991; Lemlech, 1994; Jacobsen, Eggen, &
Kauchak, 1993; Stone, 1995).
The Alleged Threat to Intrinsic Motivation.
Some developmentally inspired reservations about experimentally vindicated
methodologies are based on more than theoretical extrapolations. For example, the concerns
about reductions in intrinsic motivation due to positive reinforcement reported by Deci & Ryan
(1985), Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett (1973), and Schwartz (1990) appear to be supported by
credible empirical findings. Even these claims, however, seem to have been exaggerated without
challenge perhaps as a result of developmentalism's enormous influence within the educational
community.
For the past seventy-five or so years, the teaching profession has idealized learning that is
motivated by interest as the only "true" learning. Led by Dewey (1916/1963; 1938/1963), the
mainstream teaching profession has held that such "intrinsic" or naturally occurring interest will
express itself provided that the student is confronted with a sufficiently meaningful or relevant or
lifelike problem. Thus teaching that relies on extrinsic sources of motivation is, according to
Dewey's concept, inherently poor teaching, i.e., insufficiently creative, innovative, and
stimulating, and its use of extrinsic incentives a concession to faulty educational practice. The
widespread acceptance of Dewey's developmentally informed vision seems likely to have
contributed to the positive reception given the reports of Deci, Ryan, Lepper, et al. and, more
recently, to Kohn's (1993a, 1993b) wholesale derogation of positive reinforcement, incentives,
rewards, and competition.
The technical foundations of these reports, however, have been the subject of scholarly
disagreement, and the exaggerated nature of their claims has become evident in the recent
meta-analysis by Cameron and Pierce (1994). Reviewing the literature from 1971 to the present,
they conclude that the empirical findings with respect to intrinsic motivation simply do not
warrant exclusion of incentives from the classroom.
One other telling observation may be made about Kohn's (1993a, 1993b) criticisms.
Positive reinforcement and other extrinsic sources of motivation have been successfully
employed by school psychologists, special educators, and teachers of remedial and "at risk"
students for many years (Hallahan, Kauffman, & Lloyd, 1985; Hammill & Bartel, 1990).
Apparently that evidence has been overlooked or discounted. Perhaps such applications are
considered exempt from developmentalist strictures because students to whom they are applied
have acknowledged developmental imperfections.
Despite their success, however, interventions that are known to benefit the disabled are not
entirely immune from criticism. For example, there is ongoing debate among early childhood
special educators regarding "early intervention" versus "developmentally appropriate practice."
Again, the question is one of whether successful experimentally founded intervention strategies
are producing some subtle but as-yet- unnoticed developmental harm (Carta, Schwartz, Atwater
& McConnell, 1991; Johnson & Johnson, 1992).
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The Alleged Inattention to Thinking.
Of the developmentally inspired concerns pertaining to experimentally vindicated teaching
methods, their alleged neglect of student thinking is, by far, the most frequent criticism
(Armstrong & Savage, 1994; Callahan, Clark, & Kellough, 1992; Clark & Starr, 1991; Henson,
1993; Jacobsen, Eggen, & Kauchak, 1993; Kim & Kellough, 1995; Lemlech, 1994; Ornstein,
1992; Sheperd & Ragan, 1992). These concerns and the current pedagogical emphasis on
cognitive processes, higher-order intellectual skills, critical thinking, reflective thinking, etc.,
again, reflect Dewey's (1916/1963) view of learning:
The sole direct path to enduring improvement in the
methods of instruction and learning consists in
centering upon the conditions which exact, promote, and
test thinking. Thinking is the method of intelligent
learning, of learning that employs and rewards the mind.
(p. 153)
The same can be said of the present day emphasis on hands-on, authentic, real-world learning
experiences as a means of facilitating learning:
Only by wrestling with the conditions of . . . [a]
problem at first hand, seeking and finding his own way
out, does . . . [the student] think. When the parent
or teacher has provided the conditions which stimulate
thinking and has taken a sympathetic attitude toward the
activities of the learner by entering into a common or
conjoint experience, all has been done which a second
party can do to instigate learning. The rest lies with
the one directly concerned. (Dewey, 1916/1963, p. 160)
Both Dewey (1916/1963) and Piaget (Siegler, 1991) considered human learning
capabilities the product of evolutionary demands for intellectual adaptation to the natural world.
Formal knowledge and skills were held to be important only to the extent that they were
integrated with applications to problem solving. If natural circumstances required humans to
learn and employ knowledge in the context of problem solving, Dewey reasoned that schools
would optimize learning by doing the same. Thus in Dewey's scheme of education, thinking in
service of problem solving is primary to education and acquisition of formal knowledge and
competencies is secondary and incidental.
What Dewey may not have adequately considered is that traits evolved under one set of
conditions can prove useful under other conditions and in service of entirely different ends. For
example, human hands were not initially selected- for because of their usefulness in writing or
musical performance but they subsequently served that purpose. Analogously, the ability to
acquire and retain knowledge may have been selected-for under conditions where knowledge was
wholly contextualized, yet today the same ability can be usefully employed to acquire knowledge
that is partly or wholly decontextualized.
Given the advantages that industrial and technological cultures appear to derive from
formal instruction afforded in a classroom setting, it seems evident that a profitable use has been
found for the human ability to acquire factual, abstract, and decontextualized knowledge and that
acquisition of such knowledge is a useful prerequisite to real-world, problem solving
experiences. In fact, it would seem that schooling in societies which make use of the formal
knowledge cumulated from the experiences of innumerable ancestors would necessarily entail a
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substantial amount of decontextualized learning. Thus the achievement of preconceived
objectives through experimentally vindicated teaching methodologies may afford socially,
economically, and pedagogically advantageous gains in educational efficiency despite its
inconsistency with the ideals inherent in Dewey, Piaget, and other popular theorists.
Why Non-experimental Research is Better Accepted
In contrast to the skepticism typically encountered by experimentally founded
interventions, teaching practices informed by studies of naturally occurring social and
educational processes are relatively well received by the educational community. Even if not
adapted to developmental considerations, such practices do not suggest artificially imposed
alterations of "natural" conditions. Thus if peer interaction processes or certain teacher or student
characteristics are found to be correlated with student achievement, teachers can be safely
encouraged to take advantage of these "natural" (and presumably causal) relationships by
creatively interpreting and selectively employing them as developmental considerations permit.
Studies of relationships between educational outcomes and student learning styles (Dunn,
Beaudrey, & Klavas, 1989; Shipman & Shipman, 1985) are a good example. The recent surge of
recommendations favoring greater sensitivity to multicultural diversity in the schools also seem
founded on this type of research (Boykin, 1986; Thompson, Entwisle, Alexander, & Sundius,
1992). In each case, these studies encourage teachers to shape instruction to the preferences and
inclinations of the student in order to enhance achievement to the extent that student proclivities
will permit.
Unfortunately, of course, the causal inferences suggested by descriptive and correlational
studies can be grossly misleading and their misinterpretation has lead to some of the most
egregious instances of faulty teaching practice. The attempt to improve learning by boosting selfesteem is a prime example (Scheirer & Kraut, 1979).
The Incompatibility of Developmental and Experimental Views
Given the nature of the developmentalist view, experimentally demonstrated teaching
practices are bound to invite a great degree of skepticism. The object of experimental research is
to demonstrate the impact of an independent variable as an agent of change. Contrary to such an
objective, developmentalism requires that social, emotional, and cognitive change emerge, not as
an effect induced by an external agent, but as an independent expression of the student. Thus
experimentally tested methodologies are automatically considered suspect if not outrightly
objectionable depending on which developmental limitations are presumed applicable. In effect,
developmentalist doctrine discourages reliance on the most important and most credible research
educators have at their disposal (Bloom, 1980 as cited in Gage & Berliner, 1992; Cook &
Campbell, 1979).
Because they claim an applicability that never seems adequately tempered by
developmental considerations, experimentally validated methods tend to encounter an impassable
gauntlet of questions and reservations. In a reference to Walberg's (1984) report of generalizable,
robust, and teacher- alterable influences on learning, Ralph Tyler (1984) expressed the forlorn
hope that the (developmentalist) notion that each student and each circumstance is so unique that
it can only be understood (i.e., effectively taught) by a teacher deeply immersed in the situation
would be dispelled.
Armstrong (1980) raised the same issue in discussing teacher demand for educational
research:
Given the nature of undergraduate teacher preparation programs and the cultural
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milieux of large numbers of schools, many teachers have come to believe that
teaching is more art than science. Exposed to much talk about "individual
differences" and "unique characteristics" of every classroom, many view teaching
and teaching problems as situation-specific. Through their training and interactions
with many colleagues, large numbers of teachers are more predisposed to
acknowledge the differences than the commonalties characterizing the human
condition. Consequently, many teachers suspect any generalized statements about
human behavior. This orientation prompts many to doubt the value of educational
research efforts that, by design, seek generalizable knowledge. (p. 59)
The restrictions on effective practice posed by developmentalism have largely precluded
many otherwise credible attempts to improve education through applications of science. The
contrast between the degree of scientifically founded progress in medicine versus that found in
education attests this conclusion. To a large extent, medical science has benefitted man by
employing scientifically informed means of intervening in nature. The artificial creation of
immunities through the use of "unnatural" and invasive vaccination is an historic example. In
contrast, educational improvements on "natural" patterns and processes of learning have been
severely restricted by a doctrine of developmentalism. Instead of using experimentally validated
teaching methods, teachers have been encouraged to emulate nature and thereby preserve the
perfection assumed to exist in natural developmental processes.

Conclusion
Developmentalism presumes typical patterns and processes of social, emotional, and
cognitive change to be optimal because they are "natural." It fails to recognize the extent to
which valued social, emotional, and cognitive attributes may be induced and sustained (not
merely facilitated) by the purposeful actions of teachers and parents. Indeed, it seems to
underestimate the importance of civilizing influences generally. By default, developmentalism
ascribes the positive effects of unrecognized environmental influences to "natural" processes and
argues that attempts to alter their effects are likely to be harmful.
Present day developmentalism frames the process of socialization and, specifically, that of
teaching as one of influencing the child in such a way as to avoid disruption of a postulated
optimal outcome. It transforms teaching from an endeavor straightforwardly concerned with
achievement to a search for naturalistic conditions that will fit the learner's tendencies in a way
that permits the unfettered and, therefore presumably optimal, emergence of intellectual growth.
Developmentalism assumes that teaching which deviates from this general prescription is, at
best, naive and, at worst, dangerous and destructive of the learner's best interests. Thus teaching
practices uninformed by developmental considerations are persistently rejected by the teaching
profession regardless of demonstrated educational effectiveness and otherwise wholesome
impact--a pervasive and powerful but largely unrecognized restriction on scientifically founded
educational improvement.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement
June 10 1996
Don Tinkler
dtinkler@schnet.edu.au
I have some sympathy with the position taken by Prof. Stone, and given the opportunity
and the time, would like to discuss further with him the many claims he makes about moves in
education over the past twenty or so years, whether in the United States or Australia.
Having said that, I must protest that in applying 'developmentalism' as an umbrella term,
Stone has ignored the distinctions between the various sub-sets of developmentalism. In the
abstract accompanying the paper, Stone concludes:
... its [developmentalism] most recent expressions include "developmentally
appropriate practice" and "constructivism". In the years during which it gained
ascendance, developmentalism served as a basis for rejecting harsh and inhumane
teaching methods. Today it impedes efforts to hold schools accountable for student
academic achievement.
The inference seems to be that constructivism, being a more recent expression, is the
impediment.
Prof. Stones' claim that 'constructivism discourages teachers and parents from asserting
themselves with children' indicates a failure to understand the importance for education of the
shift not only to a practice that takes account of something more than behavioural outcomes, but
to one where the provision of quality experiences establishes the mental connections that enable
learners to construct more satisfactory understandings of their individual realities.
I concede that the early varieties of developmentalism based on stages of development or
stages of cognitive growth served as a basis for rejecting inappropriate (harsh and inhumane)
teaching methods, and that many of the practices of the so-called child- centred movement failed
because of complete lack of structure. However, I would need further convincing before agreeing
that developmentalist (constructivist) practices constitute an impediment to strategies that might
be applied to hold schools accountable for student academic achievement. There is of course the
problem that professor Stone and I would probably be in considerable disagreement on the
definition of both the terms, "academic" and "achievement."
Perhaps the opening of the abstract could have more accurately have read: 'Because of
continuing and justified criticism of public education, much of the so-called "experimentally
demonstrated" teaching methodology ought to have been rejected and abandoned long ago.'
"Constructivism" has developed from a rediscovery of the importance of "mind" in the
teaching-learning equation. The resultant shift of emphasis has been from teaching to learning
with teachers now having to ask themselves what must I do so that my students can learn with
understanding, rather than asking what I must do to teach (instruct)?
Lauren Resnick (1983) asserted that:
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... the accumulated body of cognitive task analysis and the emerging work on
cognitive theories of acquisition clearly signal the need for a constructivist theory of
instruction. It now seems absolutely certain that our task is to develop a theory that
places the learner's active mental construction at the very heart of the instructional
exchange. Instruction cannot simply put knowledge into people's heads. Instead,
effective instruction must aim to place learners in situations where the constructions
that they naturally and inevitably make as they try to make sense of their worlds are
correct as well as sensible ones. (Resnick's emphases)
My own contribution since the late seventies is accepted as essentially constructivist. As
one of the pioneers, I applied the emerging theory to the development of curriculum in social
education, providing an expanded form of social studies incorporating aspects of anthropology,
economics, politics, the life sciences, earth science, some mathematics as well as the more
traditional history and geography at levels suitable for children in years K through 6. The
curriculum was developed on what has become known as the 'logical sequential' model, taking
into account the need for higher order language skills and the factors of mental growth,
development of concepts, the need for quality experiences, values education, scope and sequence
and spiral development of experiences and concepts.
The theorising supporting its development and the original curriculum matrix chart,
published in 1981, have generated numbers of articles, papers and presentations which since
1984 have been delivered in all States of Australia and on visits to London, various cities in the
US and Toronto. A teacher handbook with a revised version of the chart, published in 1989 (2nd
edition 1990) is widely dispersed and has received approval from educators in many other
countries.
A presention for the 10th World Congress on Gifted and Talented Education (1993),
Toronto, Canada, encapsulates something of the theory and practice developed since 1981, and I
include with this commentary the first few pages of that paper:
A CURRICULUM THAT LIBERATES THE LEARNER
Presentation for the 10th World Congress on Gifted and Talented Education, Toronto, Canada August 8 to 13, 1993
Don E Tinkler, Consultant in Education, Melbourne, Australia
-----------------------------------------

... the gulf between the mature or adult products and the experience and abilities of
the young is so wide that the very situation forbids much active participation by the
pupils in the development of what is taught. Theirs is to do - and learn... that which
is taught is thought of as essentially static. It is taught as a finished product, with
little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that
will surely occur in the future. It is to a large extent the cultural product of societies
that assumed the future would be much like the past, and yet it is used as
educational food in a society where change is the rule, not the exception.
The problem for progressive education is: What is the place and meaning of
subject-matter and of organization within experience?
It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, or even the activity in
experience. Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had.
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John Dewey, 1938 (Dewey's
emphases)
---------------------------------------------While attacking traditional schooling which imposed knowledge on students in a
'kind of institution sharply marked off from any other form of social organization',
Dewey was also strong in his criticism of the 'progressives' for the way they had
distorted his theory of experience to the extent that any school experience was
accepted as being as good as any other. Although approaching eighty years of age, to
set the record straight, Dewey wrote Experience in Education from which these
quotes are taken.
It is a matter of history (Samples 1976) that Dewey fell from favor when the
United States was beaten in the space race by the Russian Sputnik in 1957. Called to
account for what was accepted as a national disgrace, a conference of scientists and
educators at Woods Hole in Massachusetts the following year, chaired by Gerome
Bruner, looked to the ideas of Jean Piaget to redirect U.S. educational philosophy.
So it was that Piaget's 'stages' theory was released on the educational world in 1964.
Piaget emerged as the dominant theorist, while Dewey faded into relative obscurity.
This paper will assert that it is time the learner was freed from the constraints
imposed by traditional schooling as claimed by Dewey, and yet offered more than
'progressive' education as an alternative.
It will present an overview of more than fifteen years effort which has
resulted in the generation of a 'constructivist' theory of learning, a new curriculum
design, the publication of The Humanities Core Curriculum (1981, 1989), a
curriculum chart dealing with an expanded view of social education, and a teacher
handbook which explains how that curriculum can be individualized for regular
classroom use or for pull-out programs for 'gifted' students.
The innovative approach emphasizes learning with understanding and
provides new relevance to social education. At the same time it offers an opportunity
to teachers to make more effective use of their developed skills in curriculum
planning, facilitating, monitoring, and evaluation.
The handbook Social Education for Australian Primary Schools (2nd Ed.
1990) takes a fresh look at a wide range of educational and curriculum issues,
unpacks some of the emerging theory about learning with understanding, and
converts it into sound practice in social education. Subtitled A 'Futures' Perspective,
it was written for teachers and others engaged in helping young people make sense
of a very complex worldÑboth in the present and into the longer term future.
Skills Building For the Future
Since no one can know the future, the plural form 'futures' is used. We can
talk of 'possible', 'probable' and 'preferred' futures. Possible futures take in anything
that could possibly happen; probable futures refer to those that are likely to happen
on the probability of certain things occurring or not occurring; and preferred futures
refer to those that might be selected from the 'probable' futures as being more
desirable.
Professor David Suzuki of the University of British Columbia in a broadcast
in 1987 claimed that 'human beings have become the most reliable failure
component in technology today'. Educators must ask why we should accept a future
where human beings continue to be the most 'reliable failure components' in our
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advancing technology?
Attention of the world several years ago was focused upon literacy and the
problems of illiteracy. However, we should perhaps then have been asking whether
the level of literacy considered satisfactory in 1950, or even as recently as 1980, will
be suitable for the nineties and beyond.
The theme for the Australian Reading Association First International
Conference (1993) was Literacy For The New Millennium. Most speakers seemed to
think that literacy for the new millennium meant little more than holding to the
status quoÑall students being expected to develop the skills of reading, writing and
listening. While conceding that there was much that we could do to develop more
effective skills in these areas, there seemed little awareness of the recent reports of
the OECD where reference was made to 'enterprise skills' as being like a 'third
passport' enabling students to cross from school to the world outside. Nor did it seem
that speakers knew of the parallel work of UNESCO and the call of its Symposium
in Beijing late in 1989 for:
* a new view of knowledge;
* a greater integration of knowledge;
* a renewed commitment to lifelong learning;
* an education system with shifts of emphases from conformity to
creativity and innovativeness,
- from competitiveness to co-operativeness,
- from private benefits of learning to public benefits,
- from instruction to learning how to learn,
- to nourishing the higher-order skills,
- to positive aspects of personal development,
- to promote tolerance in interrelating with others.
Taking account of the emerging ecological and global threats to survival, the
UNESCO Symposium cautioned that educational planners will need to restructure
education to fit people for the twenty-first century, which, in their words, 'now will
probably be rather different from what we would have predicted as recently as five
years ago'.
In the mid 1980s a 'Creative Cities' conference in Melbourne was told by its
Keynote speaker, Dr. Rashmi Mayur, Director of the Urban Development Institute in
Bombay and advisor to the United Nations and the U.S. Congress, that what was
really needed was 'creative people', that is, people who could think creatively about
future needs and about future directions. It is certain that the most important
resources in any future will be the human resources. Tomorrow's people will need
greater capacity for creating choices, and thinking through the choices between
competing options. They will need also a wider range of personal skills--some of
which we can only guess at today.
All this points to the need perhaps to look at literacy in a different way as we
approach the new millennium.
Learner Monitored Learning
In England the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures
and Commerce (RSA), has adopted 'Education for Capability', a program with major
focus upon secondary schools and tertiary institutions. According to the RSA,
'Education for Capability is a practical nationwide campaign to develop the talents of
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all young people and give them the confidence that comes with succes.'
The RSA joined with the World Education Fellowship and several other
institutions in convening the First International Conference on Learner Managed
Learning in April 1990.
At the conference, experiences were shared by those who had allowed
learners to apply their 'enterprise' skills in programs of self directed learning and
decision making. There were reports of learner contracts, experiential learning, peer
tutoring, inquiry and problem solving approaches having been trialed.
With time to reflect upon the issues of the conference, I am convinced that, at
least in the formative years of primary and secondary school, and maybe even in
tertiary education, the learner does not 'manage' but rather 'monitors' his/her learning
processes. Just as in the one-teacher school, the monitor works as a mediator under
the guidance and supervision of the teacher, we could look at self-directed learning
as the learner mediating the learning processes with the teacher as manager or
facilitator.
Some years ago, Paul Brandwein (1977) suggested that 'the child comes to
school with a comprehension consisting of a world of constructs, which we know to
be somewhat faulty. But he comes, nevertheless, with an idiosyncratic way of
learning'.
It seems that the teacher's task is to discover the idiosyncrasy, to help correct
the faults in the constructs, and lead the child forward towards increased
comprehension about the world. Teachers can help children become aware of their
own learning--referred to as 'metacognition' or 'awareness of awareness.'
Monitoring one's learning will require the development of a range of
competencies for problem solving, research and data processing. Those
competencies in turn will depend upon establishing the sub-skills of reflection,
analysis, comparing, inference, classification, and synthesis--the so called 'thinking
skills.'
Thinking skills can be taught. Parents can encourage the development of a
range of basic thinking strategies, but perhaps the most appropriate time to start
training in thinking skills is when the child reaches the primary school.
The Search for an Alternative Theory of Knowledge Acquisition
The search for answers to questions arising from years of classroom teaching
led me to look at various theories of knowledge 'acquisition,' and then to examine
what teachers might do to speed up and strengthen the processes of acquisition.
In the late 1960s I had been involved in the implementation of a new science
approach derived from the Nuffield Science curriculum developed in the U.K., and
had been impressed by the theories of Jean Piaget which underpinned that program.
A short time later, I took up a study of the writings of Immanuel Kant and his impact
upon education. In challenging Kant's notion of a priori concepts, 'knowledge
absolutely independent of all experience', I developed the idea of 'mental
abstraction', explained then as the 'activity of the brain/mind in matching,
comparing, analyzing and synthesizing the mass of impressions coming in through
the various sense receptors and leading to the formation of concepts'.
Piaget's 1960s theory had four factors affecting cognitive growth. They were:
(i) Nervous maturation
(ii) Experience
(iii) Social transmission
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(iv) Equilibration
That theory I refer to as the 'autonomous' model--autonomous, because
growth was determined by 'equilibration', Piaget's invented term for a self-regulatory
mechanism which acted to correct any disequilibrium brought about by new
experiences. Equilibration also raised an individual to higher 'stages' of cognitive
growth.
In struggling to apply Piaget's 1960's theories to the design of a new social
studies curriculum in 1978, I came to a similar conclusion to that later reported by
Lauren Resnick of the Learning Research and Development Center at the University
of Pittsburgh when she commented in 1983 that 'Piagetian theory provides a very
weak guide for instructional efforts'.
I returned to my notion of 'mental abstraction' as a likely theoretical
foundation to resolve the dilemma.
In developing an alternative 'supportive' model of cognitive growth, I
discounted Piaget's 'stages' in favor of the idea that the growth is continuous, though
irregular; the irregularity being influenced by four factors:
(i) The total state of the brain and the central nervous system;
(ii) the level and the quality of experience;
(iii) the level and the quality of social interaction; and
(iv) 'sound pedagogy' (the art/craft of teaching--something that can be
applied by a parent, a peer, or some other person, as well as the
professional teacher)
'Equilibration' is no longer needed, since the process of cognitive growth can
be more parsimoniously explained as due to the activity of 'mental abstraction.'
The following is a further explication of the 'supportive' model and the four
factors which influence cognitive growth:
Factor (i) the total state of the brain and the central nervous system:
Rather than being looked at simply as the 'nature' aspect in the long
running nature-nurture debate, the model takes into account the
information being generated by brain scientists in their attempt to
analyze and synthesize what happens as the billions of cells and neural
connections in the brain respond to information inputs. No one has yet
made the link between input and learning, except to suggest that there is
both chemical and electrical activity within the brain in response to
input.
Chemical imbalance, physical or emotional trauma, fatigue, boredom,
illness, prescription or other drugs, hunger and dehydration, may affect
brain efficiency. Therefore 'total condition' seems to be a more adequate
descriptor for what is a major variable. Piaget's 'maturity' factor, as
presented by him in the 1960s, seems by comparison to be a less
satisfactory alternative.
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Factor (ii) the level and quality of experience
Although concepts are generated by experience, not all experiences are
of equal value. Recalling the statements of John Dewey on the
importance of experience, it is suggested that in the contrived
environment of the classroom teachers should select experiences largely
on the criteria of quality.
Factor (iii) the level and quality of social interaction
In recent years there has been an increasing concentration upon self
concept as being important to effective learning. Of major importance in
the development of positive self concepts are the kinds of relationships
that have already developed in student personal social interaction in
groups, whether that might have been within the family, among peers,
or with children and teachers in previous classes.
Factor (iv) 'sound pedagogy' (the art/craft of teaching)
The dictionary defines 'pedagogy' as the 'science or profession of
teaching; also as the theory of teaching how to teach'. As this was the
nearest to the idea of 'teaching craft', the term was adopted as the factor
which it seemed had been ignored by Piaget in his 1960s theories on
cognitive growth.
It should be noted that 'sound pedagogy' consistently involves deliberate
interventions that also involve factors (ii) and (iii). To put it another
way; sound teaching craft can, among other things, supplement personal
experience and social interaction as influences on mental (cognitive)
development.
'Sound pedagogy' is much more than 'instruction'. In applying sound
pedagogy the teacher's task extends beyond simply providing and
managing experiences. The role of the teacher expands to include all of
the following:
* selecting experiences using 'quality' as a measure of
appropriateness;
* organising, timing, monitoring and managing the experiences;
* providing order in the experiences presented (giving consideration
to scope and sequence in what is presented as curriculum);
* attempting to reduce some of the complexity of the material or
information being presented; (The world for both children and adults
is indeed complex, but if some of the complexity is reduced in
presenting ideas initially, the learnings often make more sense when
later placed back into their original complexity);
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* Drawing learners into purposeful two-way communication;
(generating a climate where learners are free to inquire, to explore
issues, to formulate questions, to express ideas, to debate points of
view, and to seek solutions to problems);
* extending the learners' interaction with the learning environment
(extending the range and variety of the learning context).
Classrooms are by nature busy places. There is such a variety of factors
operating; so many things going on simultaneously; so much that is
completely unpredictable; decisions to be made immediately; events
that are very public, some embarrassingly so - both for students and for
teachers; and each of the human elements enter with a personal
background and contribute to a class history that is completely unique.
In spite of the 'busy-ness', care should be taken to establish a climate
built on concern for and a warm acceptance of each member, a
classroom climate in which honesty, open-ness and mutual trust can
develop.
Constructivist Theory
The theory that developed is essentially 'constructivist' in nature, suggesting that we
each construct our own 'reality' or 'world picture' through the processing by the brain
of sensory input. The reality is dependent upon both the range and the quality of that
sensory input--a limited experiences results in a limited reality, a broad range of
experience generates an elaborated reality.
'Constructivist' theory provides a rationale for many of the recent innovative
approaches to learning. It explains why students seem to do better through such
strategies as experiential learning, inquiry learning, problem solving, cooperative
group learning, and student-negotiated curriculum. Further, constructivism
underpins the importance now being attributed in education to self-esteem and to
'metacognition.' The theory is also consistent with many of the conclusions of recent
research into novice-expert representations of knowledge.
(A more detailed explication of 'mental abstraction' and the resultant
'constructivist' theory has been given in various papers since first
presented in 1981.)
Although the theory developed from the re-think of the late 1970s it parallels
the work later reported by Lauren Resnick, and the Caine and Caine publication for
the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD). Several
quotes will suffice:
The human mind has been rediscovered, or at least re-affirmed;
reasoning and thought are central objects of scientific study ... It seems
evident that a cognitive theory of instruction should be emerging
alongside our increasingly elaborated theories of cognitive
performance and development.
Lauren Resnick (1983)
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Brain research establishes and confirms that multiple complex and
concrete experiences are essential for meaningful learning and
teaching. Optimizing the use of the human brain means using the
brain's infinite capacity to make connections Ñand understanding what
conditions maximize this process.
Caine and Caine (1990)
Reinforcement for the direction taken was accepted to come from a
further Resnick statement:
It now seems absolutely certain that our task is to develop a theory of
intervention that places the learner's active mental construction at the
very heart of the instructional exchange.
In a recent yearbook of the ASCD, Cawelti makes the comment that the most
critical ingredient of successful schools is the teacher and the quality of the teaching
in the classroom. Referring briefly to the dominance of behaviorists over the past
several decades, he draws attention to the chapter by Peterson and Knapp. In
Cawelti's words:
They record the important work of the 'constructivists' who are seeking
to demonstrate how students must be helped to create their own
meaning out of the learning experiences the school provides.
He adds a further comment:
The constructivist movement in learning will do much to help get
students more involved, particularly if students can be helped to see that
in adult life they will need to know what they are being asked to learn.
The 'Logical Sequential' Model of Curriculum Design and Development
From the outset, I had accepted social studies to include aspects of anthropology,
economics, politics, natural and applied sciences, as well as history and geography,
and set the following objectives:
The curriculum should:
- emphasize the need for children to develop an understanding of self,
the relationship of self to others, and from that an understanding of
society;
- provide a structure of scope and sequence from Kindergarten to
Year-six;
- present a core of suggested experiences and learnings in social studies
Y-K through Y-6;
- provide children with quality experiences;
- position the experiences and concepts over the seven year period based
on an appropriate theory of cognitive growth;
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- give weighting to both content and process;
- allow experiences and concepts to be interrelated within the structure;
- be constructed of selected categories of social studies rising as
expanding experience spirals, providing later reinforcement for earlier
experiences;
- give prominence to the ideas developed at a seminar in 1976 with
Professor Jack Fraenkel of San Francisco concerning an education in
values.
When published as a research document in 1981, the Humanities Core
Curriculum (HCC) fold-out chart was extremely well received by teachers,
administrators, parents and academics in all States of Australia. Visitors from
overseas and representatives of national publishers also showed considerable
interest.
The HCC Chart and the handbook are an outcome of applying the "Logical
Sequential Model" to the design of curriculum.
[then followed a statement explaining how the curriculum was applied
in developing class programs]
*************************
The need to shift theory and practice is becoming more apparent as schools move to
include convergent communications and information technologies in their delivery
of curriculum.
During the past four years, I have been working with colleagues on a series of
investigations for governments in Australia into the application of state-of-the-art
technologies in the delivery of education at all levels, from schools to universities.
The findings recorded in three major reports endorse the importance of the shift to
constructivism made both by educators at the leading edge and the instructional
designers responsible for developing quality educational software in opening up a
future of new learning opportunities.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

2 May 1996

John Stone
STONEJ@EDUSERV.EAST-TENN-ST.EDU

On May 2, 1996 (#2) Sherman Dorn wrote:
Educational researchers conduct surveys of principals and teachers all the time
about such things, and it seems to me one could try to have a *rough* gauge of such
influence. Having evidence of its influence back to the 1960s is what I doubt one
could have. But that is what Stone is suggesting, and I doubt it is true. When
reasonable people differ on questions like this, anecdotes are insufficient. One needs
detailed case studies or broader evidence.
I will see if I can find some survey evidence. Surprisingly, I think I can produce a great
deal in the way of neoprogressive exponents of developmentalism. The 1962 ASCD Yearbook
"Perceiving, Behaving, and Becoming featured Abe Maslow, Earl Kelly, Art Combs, and Carl
Rogers-- all claiming that the central purpose of schooling was the personal (i.e., psychological)
development of the student. The 1972 ASCD yearbook edited by J.R. Squire is titled "A New
Look at Progressive Education." It favored many of the same authors and presented approvingly
most of the developmentalist concepts that underpinned the then discredited progressive
education movement.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

2 May 1996

John Stone
STONEJ@EDUSERV.EAST-TENN-ST.EDU

Sherman Dorn writes:
I would also bet that many people who use developmentalism as an *excuse* not to
change teaching methods are doing so, at least in part, for other reasons. Intense
instruction, even to small groups of students, is even more exhausting than poor
teaching.
I agree with you entirely. Although I have not carefully examined this hypothesis, I
suspect developmentalism may be appealing for economic reasons. So long as teaching is a
matter of fitting instruction to highly individualized developmental patterns and the danger of
inappropriate intervention is great, teaching is bound to require lots of teachers and take lots of
time. Also if intangible developmental limitations bar progress, teacher accountability measures
must be questioned.
As to your point about the work involved in intensive instruction and for that matter, the
work in learning research based modes of instruction, there is no question that resistance on such
grounds does exist. However, I must hasten to say that there is very little to encourage teachers to
work hard and to insure learning because achievement outcomes are typically given so little
attention.
As to published reports of intervention oriented programs discarded or rejected on
account of differences with what seems to be developmentalist thinking, I can refer
you to the following off the top of my head:
Thanks for posting these.
I will see if I can locate more. I'm confident they exist.
On the influence of Dewey:
As to Cremin's account of progressive education, it is reasonable to contend that the
Progressive Education Association did lose connection with Dewey's philosophy...
That the Association changed is one thing, that "progressive education" changed is
another.
The criticism of progressive education after WWII was focused on the PEA and the
Life Adjustment Movement -- most incisively (as in Arthur Bestor) the curriculum of

1 of 2

high schools. I've read Bestor, and I don't recall where developmental psychology
was an issue, either explicitly or implicitly.
I agree with your understanding of Bestor's critique and you are right that the life
adjustment movement was not explicitly premised on developmental psychology. In my view,
however, that which Bestor found objectionable was consistent with the developmentalist
thinking that had been inherent in the progressive education movement since its earliest days.
Marietta Johnson, for example, had been greatly influenced by developmental ideas in her
formulation of the Organic School and much of her thinking entered into the early expression of
principles by the PEA. A key idea was that education cannot stress only the intellectual aspects of
growing and developing without doing violence to the other areas. The idea of educating the
"whole child" was, thus, a centerpiece of progressive thinking throughout the twenties and
thirties and much of the life adjustment concept seems entirely consistent. For example, the 1948
Commission for Life Adjustment Education for Youth described life adjustment education (in
part): "It is concerned with ethical and moral living and with physical, mental, and emotional
health." Bestor's criticism of this kind of thinking (in a 1953 New Republic article) was that
schools have a far narrower and more intellectual mission and that church, home, and other
institutions and agencies should minister to the other needs of youth. "The idea that the school
must undertake to meet every need that some other agency is failing to meet is a preposterous
delusion that can wreck the educational system without contributing anything to the salvation of
society."
More relevant to the matter of doctrine and the ideas imported to the schools are the
progressive and neo progressive nature of therecommendations about sound
teaching practice issued by the National Education Association and the U. S. Office
of Education (also by the U. S. Bureau of Education).
I would take this with a grain of salt, sort of like the mothering recommendations
put out by the Child Bureau (or, later, Spock). Some portion of the population saw
them as bibles, but they're not evidence of actual childrearing practice or even
widespread philosophies.
I agree that the fact of such recommendations are not the same thing as observed practices
and as I mentioned in my reply to Rick (and some others, off-list), my thesis is not that
developmentalist practices such as progressive education have thoroughly captivated the schools.
Rather my thesis is that the developmentalist premises have served to encourage the adoption of
a variety of practices that are consistent with such thinking and, moreover, that they have
discouraged the adoption of practices that seem to have high promise of effectiveness.
Thanks again for your thoughtful commentary.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

2 May 1996

Sherman Dorn
dornsj@CTRVAX.VANDERBILT.EDU

On April 30, 1996 Rick Garlikov wrote:
It is very difficult to give evidence of a pervasive but unconscious attitude in a field.
Educational researchers conduct surveys of principals and teachers all the time about such
things, and it seems to me one could try to have a rough gauge of such influence. Having
evidence of its influence back to the 1960s is what I doubt one could have. But that is what Stone
is suggesting, and I doubt it is true. When reasonable people differ on questions like this,
anecdotes are insufficient. One needs detailed case studies or broader evidence.
Rick Garlikov writes:
I thought that what J.E. Stone said "fit" many of the teachers I know who DO adhere
to some of the pedagogical philosophies that he calls "developmentalist."
Yes, and it agrees with my impressions of some teachers, too. However, that is not nearly
as persuasive an explanation of resistance as other, more mundane, and more widespread forces.
I thought the paper was important, but it is difficult to characterize what "kind" of
scholarship effort it represents if one is into such categorizing. Still I think it was a
good, worthwhile, and scholarly article.
Oh, I think so, too, and I will certainly recommend it to students alongside other works
about resistance of teachers to change. One does not have to think a work is unscholarly to
disagree with it.

1 of 1

Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

2 May 1996

Sherman Dorn
dornsj@CTRVAX.VANDERBILT.EDU

J. E. Stone writes:
I agree that the present paper offers no empirical evidence of developmentalism as a
barrier. My primary aim was to bring into focus a phenomenon that, in my view,
pervades education in such a way that it has veritably become part of the air we
breathe. I have named it and sought to show its educational significance.
I think it's provocative and a plausible thesis and, as I wrote Rick, I will suggest people
read it. However, I'm more cautious about it, because resistance to change is more widespread
than the people who adhere to what you call developmentalist philosophies. I would also bet that
many people who use developmentalism as an *excuse* not to change teaching methods are
doing so, at least in part, for other reasons. Intense instruction, even to small groups of students,
is even more exhausting than poor teaching.
As to published reports of intervention oriented programs discarded or rejected on
account of differences with what seems to be developmentalist thinking, I can refer
you to the following off the top of my head:
Thanks for posting these. You may want to use this type of evidence in future articles. It
would be more persuasive (at least to me) than citing methods textbooks.
On the influence of Dewey:
As to Cremin's account of progressive education, it is reasonable to contend that the
Progressive Education Association did lose connection with Dewey's philosophy...
That the Association changed is one thing, that "progressive education" changed is
another.
The criticism of progressive education after WWII was focused on the PEA and the Life
Adjustment Movement -- most incisively (as in Arthur Bestor) the curriculum of high schools.
I've read Bestor, and I don't recall where developmental psychology was an issue, either
explicitly or implicitly.
More relevant to the matter of doctrine and the ideas imported to the schools are the
progressive and neo progressive nature of the recommendations about sound
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teaching practice issued by the National Education Association and the U. S. Office
of Education (also by the U. S. Bureau of Education).
I would take this with a grain of salt, sort of like the mothering recommendations put out
by the Child Bureau (or, later, Spock). Some portion of the population saw them as bibles, but
they're not evidence of actual childrearing practice or even widespread philosophies.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

1 May 1996

Larry Phillips
ljp@GPU.SRV.UALBERTA.CA
I think the discussion of Stone's paper misses some important considerations. I don't think
resistance to change has anything to do with "isms". It has to do with people and what asking
them to change means to them. The following is an excerpt from a reflective essay I wrote after
shadowing several principals. It is a bit long. For those who want the essence in 25 words or less.
Change requires:
a perceived need
an effective alternative
the resources to implement it
Effecting Change in Schools: School are About People:
My last two school visits were to schools where change was causing or had caused
conflict. The visits brought home the notion that schools are about people and that bringing about
change in schools is bringing about change in people. I was also reminded that the people we
want to change may resent being told they can do better. Then there is the part that really hurts,
perhaps what is being done is best for the school and shouldn't be changed. The corollary is there
are times the students don't and shouldn't come first.
There are times when it is important for the school and hence the students to give teachers
time to change even when you are sure the needs of students currently in the classes aren't being
met. Today's student is disadvantaged to benefit tomorrows. In one school, changes in
instructional methods had been put on hold. Change had been imposed on the teachers and been
resisted. During this respite, the students are in a structured environment. This may or may not be
what the students need, but it is what the teachers need, immersion in a comfortable, familiar
environment to gather the confidence to face change.
The other school had a teacher who was experiencing difficulty. The principal was
working with the teacher to overcome these problems. In the meantime the students don't have a
teacher with a full range of competencies. If teachers are going to acknowledge their weaknesses
and provide an opportunity to overcome them, they must be confident that they will be treated
fairly. In many cases this involves remaining in the classroom, while acquiring new skills.
Demonstrated fairness is needed to make substantial changes to how teachers work together and
instructional approaches. A significant change will involve giving up an approach that has been
mastered and is familiar and learning a new skill. There needs to be assurance that time will be
given to learn the skill and help will be provided so the teacher can gain a new competency to
replace the one abandoned. If teachers aren't confident of their abilities or are unsure of
expectations they may resist change even when it doesn't directly affect them.
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Because of the high personal cost and risk, change isn't adopted lightly. To have a teacher
change instructional approaches, three conditions must be met. First the teacher has to believe the
change is necessary. Second the teacher has to be confident enough to attempt the change and
third, the teacher has to believe the new approach will be effective.
To establish a desire for change in instructional methods teachers must recognize a need
for change. Most teachers care about their students and use teaching methods they feel are best
for them. Suggesting that student needs are not being met is a comment on the teacher's
competency. If the class isn't performing well the teacher will probably be seeking help, but if the
class is doing reasonably well establishing the value of change will be more difficult. This can be
done in two ways, both of which rely on the professional ethics of the teacher. If there is an
identifiable group of students who aren't doing well, the teacher can be asked to develop a
strategy to meet those students' needs. The other approach is to examine the curriculum and
compare the requirements to student learning. Deficiencies are reason to ask for changes in
approach. Allowing the teacher to try to meet these needs using existing techniques establishes
the need for a different approach in the teacher's mind. If the student needs can be met with
current approaches, you have to ask yourself why change is needed.
Confidence to attempt change comes from respect, self respect and the respect of others.
The approach to establishing a need for change respects the teachers skills and integrity. The
change isn't being suggested because of lack of competence, the change is being made because
expectations have been changed. Involving the teacher in defining the need and suggesting an
approach to meet the need recognizes and respects the teacher's competence.
If the teacher has identified the approach as a better way to meet student needs, technical
effectiveness has been established. To believe that the approach is practical the teacher needs to
know that professional development opportunities are available to gain the required
competencies. The teacher will also need assurance that curricular and other resources will be
available to enable success. Finally the teacher will want to know that parents and the community
will support the change.
Which brings up a sticky point. The teacher isn't alone in the classroom and the school
isn't alone in the community. We looked at gaining the support of the teacher first, because it is a
necessary condition for change. If the teacher doesn't support the change it won't happen. The
parents need to understand the change and why it is being made. They will need to know that
their child's learning will not be harmed and that learning can be demonstrated. Parental support
gives the teacher confidence, a third party thinks the approach is reasonable. The parents can also
protect the program from outside interference, since the principal can point to the parents and say
they won't support altering the program. The group that never gets asked is the students. They
should be involved because they have to live with the changes. In some schools students are
made aware of the curricular expectations, but I have never seen a situation were students are
asked how they would like to be taught. I suspect it is because deep down we know we won't like
the answer.
..............
Need can be demonstrated in a number of ways. Principals can use professional
development create a desire for change. Professional development provides an opportunity to see
and explore other ways of doing things. These are important for the changes that don't directly
affect student performance, but are just better ways of working together. Request from the
community and survey results can lead to an examination of practice. Assessment results can be
used to show a need for reorganizing the school a s well as changing instructional practice. This
is particularly true if the assessment is broadened to cover all of the curricular requirements.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

30 April 1996

Aimee Howley
howley@MARSHALL.EDU
On April 30, 1996 Benjamin Levin wrote:
Sherman Dorn's comments on Stone's paper are very appropriate. We've heard a
great deal about the baneful influence of progressivism on educational outcomes,
but all the studies of classrooms continue to show the vast prevalence of traditional
teaching techniques - teachers talk, kids sit and listen or write notes or do seat work.
I wish Dewey had had as much impact as his critics say he did!
The prevalence of traditional methods may suggest that developmentalism doesn't have an
important effect on resilient practices, but it doesn't adequately counter the claim that
developmentalism serves as a rhetorical impediment to certain other practices. Acceleration of
bright students provides a case in point. Despite rather convincing evidence of the benefit of this
practice, teachers and administrators routinely disallow it. The most typical reason given is that
acceleration will interfere with the healthy social and emotional development of bright students.
Educators invoke the "whole child" argument as a way to keep from engaging in an educational
practice that they find unacceptable. Having dealt with this argument again and again, I am
convinced that, no matter how misdirected the argument may be, educators usually are
committed to it out of an earnest regard for students' well-being. Here, an ethos of
developmentalism restricts educators' consideration of reasonable alternatives. I do not think that
in most cases the argument is offered cynically or in a calculative manner.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement
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Rick Garlikov
hmwkhelp@SCOTT.NET
It is very difficult to give evidence of a pervasive but unconscious attitude in a field. I
thought that what J.E. Stone said "fit" many of the teachers I know who DO adhere to some of
the pedagogical philosophies that he calls "developmentalist". I would be hardpressed to prove
empirically it fits, but that is in part because when you spell it out as he does, they tend to deny
having that view. Yet many of the things they say logically lead to it.
I thought the paper was important, but it is difficult to characterize what "kind" of
scholarship effort it represents if one is into such categorizing. Still I think it was a good,
worthwhile, and scholarly article; and I think (as the letter in his post exemplified) that it in some
sense explains the resistance of many developmentalists to other sorts of methods --and it
explains it to people who have presented such empirically based methods and been rejected in
ways that did not make sense to them at the time, but which make sense (or are consistent with)
Prof. Stone's analysis/characterization.
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John Stone
STONEJ@EDUSERV.EAST-TENN-ST.EDU

Sherman,
Thanks for posting a reaction. My hope had been to stimulate some thought about
developmentalism as one piece of the puzzle about how and why it is so difficult to improve
educational outcomes. In the following, I will try to respond to your several points.
On April 29, 1996 Sherman writes:
Like Rick Garlikov, I found it appealing in the sense that I have witnessed some of
the dynamics which Stone claims dominates teaching.
Yet ultimately I find the article unconvincing for several reasons.
1. In an article which espouses empiricism, Stone presents remarkably little concrete
evidence that developmentalist philosophy is a primary barrier to more effective
teaching. The following are two generalizations which would need evidence to
convince me of Stone's thesis:
(a) Developmentalism has been important to teachers since the late
1960s (when, if I recall correctly, the first studies of Direct Instruction
and other quasi-experimental intervention programs were published).
(b) Developmentalism has been a barrier to the use of research-based
interventions:
(1) A developmentalist philosophy has blocked the
implementation of research-based intervention programs in
specific locations; or
(2) A substantial number of teachers across the country
have considered research-based intervention programs and
have discarded them explicitly because of developmentalist
principles.
Evidence of these is nonexistent in the article. Instead, Stone presents
what some teacher education texts say about teaching, and what some
constructivist researchers have said about specific teaching methods (or
about reinforcement in general) -- which reflect on *those texts* but
which says little either about teacher education in general or about how
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teachers make decisions in classrooms.
I agree that the present paper offers no empirical evidence of
developmentalism as a barrier. My primary aim was to bring into focus a
phenomenon that, in my view, pervades education in such a way that it has veritably
become part of the air we breathe. I have named it and sought to show its
educational significance. As to evidence of its existence or studies showing how it
has served as a barrier, I would hope that individuals who have attempted to
implement various experimentally demonstrated interventions might assess their
experiences in light of this report.
Happily, one such a assessment came to my attention yesterday. The
following is a quote from an educational researcher who has been attempting to
implement technological improvements:
Prof. Stone:
Your recent article on Developmentalism is an excellent and instructive
contribution. I have circulated it to many of my colleagues who must
confront these questions daily. Would you please also send other of
your reprints that relate to the general topic?
We have worked for several years on the Florida Schoolyear 2000
Initiative, the intention of which is to redesign public education in
Florida. We find it a daunting task, for all the reasons that you cited.
As to published reports of intervention oriented programs discarded or
rejected on account of differences with what seems to be developmentalist thinking,
I can refer you to the following off the top of my head:
Binder and Watkins (1989) Promoting effective instructional methods.
FUTURE CHOICES 1(3), 33-39.
If I recall correctly, Binder and Watkins make reference to a
"developmentalist bias" in the thinking of school personnel.
Watkins (1988, July) Project Follow Through: A story of the identification and
neglect of effective instruction. YOUTH POLICY, pp. 7-11.
Herbert Walberg at U of IL Chicago has written a number of pieces on the
rejection and disuse of experimentally grounded interventions, notably those
employing a mastery learning approach.
Sherman writes:
2. Others are more persuasive in explaining why teachers don't change
their methods much. Larry Cuban and Seymour Sarason have each
argued that teaching is innately conservative and that schools create a
conservative work culture. The most common teaching methods,
especially in secondary schools, have changed relatively little over the
past century compared to more experimental models which have existed
side-by-side with more "traditional" classes. In *every single case*,
traditional classes are more influential on the next generation of
teachers and on teachers asked to change. It hasn't really mattered
whether those experimental models were the Lab School run by Dewey
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or DISTAR, the Eight-Year project of the NEA or something else.
Schools and teachers just have not picked up on new methods easily or
faithfully. It does not require the inculcation of constructivism to have
continued that pattern in the last few decades.
I do not disagree with the observation that schools employ traditional
methods and are generally reluctant to adopt new approaches. As I indicated
yesterday in my reply to Rick Garlikov, I find teacher attitudes entirely
understandable. Teachers have to deal with classroom reality on a daily basis and, in
my opinion, it is the realities of this environment shapes their practices. Much of that
which they are taught by schools of education or in the context of inservice training
has not been well tested. Also much of what they are expected to implement--even in
those cases where the ideas are workable--is not compatible with funding patterns or
other organizational arrangements. Teachers are frequently given a brief introduction
and left to fend for themselves. In an environment in which there is no particular
premium on consistently high educational outcomes and given the dearth of realistic
(cost-effective and labor saving) advice about how to change, teachers stick with that
which they are familiar--but with one critical caveat: the strictures posed by
developmentalism.
Developmentalism in its many incarnations has, in my opinion, succeeded in
restricting the practices that teachers consider to be acceptable. For example,
teachers believe that motivation to learn must stem from interest; that pressure,
demands, and expectations for performance are apt to be harmful; and that
punishment is to be avoided. Broadly speaking, my point is not that
developmentalism has influenced the schools through the widespread adoption of
progressive, constructivist, or other such programs. Rather, I contend that in setting
informal but virtually inviolable strictures on teaching practice, developmentalism
has impeded the adoption of effective practices.
Sherman writes:
3. Stone's chronology implies that Dewey and other "developmentalists"
were far more influential on educators than they actually were. As Ellen
Lagemann wrote in Teachers College Record several years ago,
Thorndike won the battle of educational philosophies in the early
twentieth century. Dewey essentially lost, and it wasn't until decades
later that someone else (and you can argue whether it was Piaget,
Robert Coles, or others) became an effective rhetorical advocate of
treating children as having mental lives of their own. Stone cites
Lawrence Cremin's history of progressivism but omits a key message:
while becoming a dominant professional force, the Progressive
Education Association lost virtually every connection it had with
Dewey's educational philosophy -- including, critically, the parts of
Dewey which Stone identifies as developmentalist.
Similarly, I have my doubts about the reaches of constructivism. Visible
in many schools of education, sure. Identifiable among individual
teachers and principals, absolutely. But right next to constructivists
you'll find other teachers who may fail their students *just as much* as
constructivists and refuse to change even more.
I am aware of Lagemann' view, but I am not sure she takes into account the
kind of strictures I believe result from Dewey's thinking.
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As to Cremin's account of progressive education, it is reasonable to contend
that the Progressive Education Association did lose connection with Dewey's
philosophy--Counts' "Dare Progressive Education be Progressive" speech in 1932
being a watershed event (actually, of course, Counts' views were never adopted).
That the Association changed is one thing, that "progressive education" changed is
another. Citing Cremin: Pondering the relationship between the PEA and
progressive education and like pondering the relationship between religion and a
church or between ideology and a political party. The PEA changed, but did
"progressive education?"
More relevant to the matter of doctrine and the ideas imported to the schools
are the progressive and neo progressive nature of the recommendations about sound
teaching practice issued by the National Education Association and the U. S. Office
of Education (also by the U. S. Bureau of Education). Although not developmentalist
in the Rousseauian sense (in later years), they were clearly premised on what I have
termed Dewey's interactionist form of developmentalism. One could argue that
Rousseauian views went into eclipse (only to reemerge in the late sixties), but the
"developmentalism" to which I refer is a broader doctrine.
Again, thanks for your comments.
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Benjamin Levin
levin@CC.UMANITOBA.CA
Sherman Dorn's comments on Stone's paper are very appropriate. We've heard a great deal
about the baneful influence of progressivism on educational outcomes, but all the studies of
classrooms continue to show the vast prevalence of traditional teaching techniques - teachers
talk, kids sit and listen or write notes or do seat work. I wish Dewey had had as much impact as
his critics say he did!
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 8: Stone Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on
Educational Improvement

29 April 1996

Sherman Dorn
dornsj@CTRVAX.VANDERBILT.EDU
In general, I found Stone's paper, arguing that a philosophy of developmentalism blocks
many teachers from using effective teaching methods, provocative and interesting. Like Rick
Garlikov, I found it appealing in the sense that I have witnessed some of the dynamics which
Stone claims dominates teaching.
Yet ultimately I find the article unconvincing for several reasons.
1. In an article which espouses empiricism, Stone presents remarkably little concrete evidence
that developmentalist philosophy is a primary barrier to more effective teaching. The following
are two generalizations which would need evidence to convince me of Stone's thesis:
(a) Developmentalism has been important to teachers since the late 1960s (when, if I
recall correctly, the first studies of Direct Instruction and other quasi-experimental
intervention programs were published).
(b) Developmentalism has been a barrier to the use of research-based interventions:
(1) A developmentalist philosophy has blocked the implementation of
research-based intervention programs in specific locations; or
(2) A substantial number of teachers across the country have considered
research-based intervention programs and have discarded them
explicitly because of developmentalist principles.
Evidence of these is nonexistent in the article. Instead, Stone presents what some teacher
education texts say about teaching, and what some constructivist researchers have said about
specific teaching methods (or about reinforcement in general) -- which reflect on *those texts*
but which says little either about teacher education in general or about how teachers make
decisions in classrooms.
2. Others are more persuasive in explaining why teachers don't change their methods much. Larry
Cuban and Seymour Sarason have each argued that teaching is innately conservative and that
schools create a conservative work culture. The most common teaching methods, especially in
secondary schools, have changed relatively little over the past century compared to more
experimental models which have existed side-by-side with more "traditional" classes. In *every
single case*, traditional classes are more influential on the next generation of teachers and on
teachers asked to change. It hasn't really mattered whether those experimental models were the
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Lab School run by Dewey or DISTAR, the Eight-Year project of the NEA or something else.
Schools and teachers just have not picked up on new methods easily or faithfully. It does not
require the inculcation of constructivism to have continued that pattern in the last few decades.
3. Stone's chronology implies that Dewey and other "developmentalists" were far more
influential on educators than they actually were. As Ellen Lagemann wrote in Teachers College
Record several years ago, Thorndike won the battle of educational philosophies in the early
twentieth century. Dewey essentially lost, and it wasn't until decades later that someone else (and
you can argue whether it was Piaget, Robert Coles, or others) became an effective rhetorical
advocate of treating children as having mental lives of their own. Stone cites Lawrence Cremin's
history of progressivism but omits a key message: while becoming a dominant professional force,
the Progressive Education Association lost virtually every connection it had with Dewey's
educational philosophy -- including, critically, the parts of Dewey which Stone identifies as
developmentalist.
Similarly, I have my doubts about the reaches of constructivism. Visible in many schools
of education, sure. Identifiable among individual teachers and principals, absolutely. But right
next to constructivists you'll find other teachers who may fail their students *just as much* as
constructivists and refuse to change even more.
I am not denying here either the dangers of not intervening in failing educational dynamics
or the real contradictions in Dewey's or Piaget's philosophy. But one must put it in perspective.
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John Stone
STONEJ@EDUSERV.EAST-TENN-ST.EDU
Rick, thanks for your very thoughtful analysis of my recent EPAA article on
"developmentalism." It would have been advantageous to see your thinking while I was
reviewing and revising. I won't be able to address your concerns as thoroughly as they deserve in
this post, but let me begin by making 2 points:
* As you say in your last paragraph, "I believe that it is not age development that generally
creates readiness, but development through meaningful exposure or experience." In general, I
agree and I wrote about developmentalism in an attempt to counter what I see as a widely
assumed (not necessarily well understood) doctrinal limitation on how educators go about
improving their practices.
* Please bear in mind that my principal objective was the relatively narrow one of trying
to identify and describe a set of assumptions about learning and the nature of human
development and to show that they have considerable educational importance. Obviously, my
account has numerous implications for educational (and parenting) practice--chief among which
is the matter of how experimental research is used and what that has to do with more effective
schooling. A more complete treatment of how and where developmentalist assumptions intersect
with social and educational issues would require much lengthier treatment.
In the following, I will try to respond briefly to a number of your points:
(1) does not sufficiently explain or take into account the rationales, and
philosophical points, of other people for some of the approaches he refers to as
"developmental"
I agree. Much more could be said but I was only trying to show that they intersect and
likely implications.
(2) My chief concern in writing this is that the good aspects of some of the
approaches Prof. Stone considers "developmental" not be thrown out with those
elements he effectively argues are bad.
I too would not want to banish everything associated with those approaches identified as
developmental. I say, let's look at evidence of effectiveness.
3. ...the purpose of school is to give students a broader range of knowledge and skills
than whatever the workplace may likely demand... (snip) ...where schools do not
teach well enough to adequately prepare students for the workplace, that signifies a
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problem on my view only because that should be a minimal outcome of the sort of
education I seek for students.
I agree that meeting the demands of the workplace is a minimum and I too would want
schools to go well beyond. However, it is well to bear in mind that it is failure to meet the
minimum that has critical personal, social and economic implications, and that failure to meet
this minimum is a matter of central concern to the people who are paying most of us to teach. I
think if the many surveys of public opinion in the matter of educational objectives tell us
anything, they say to public elementary and secondary schools: First and foremost, do a vastly
better job of insuring that everyone has the literacy, numeracy, communication, etc. skills
necessary to the workplace (and necessary to preparedness for postsecondary learning) in the
information age.
(4) ...teachers (like anyone else) are disposed to favor specific practices with which
they are familiar and comfortable -- frequently teaching as they have been taught,
rather than teaching as they have been taught to teach in ed schools.
Having spent a career in teacher education, I will be the first to agree with the point that
teachers make only limited use of that which they have been taught in the colleges of education.
However, the truth of that assertion does not mean that teacher education (and its doctrines) is
having no effect. Rather, in my judgement, teacher training has a substantial restrictive effect.
What I have observed and learned from the relevant literature (surveys of teachers, etc.) is that
teachers frequently find that that which they are taught in the colleges of education does not work
in the classroom. For this reason, a perennial reform in teacher education is more apprenticeship
type training and less time spent on theory and methods. A companion reform in TN has been to
require education professors to spend so many days per year in the schools. I teach the required
developmental psychology courses (for teachers and non teachers), and teacher surveys find that
such courses are among the most inapplicable.
Confronted with the daily reality of having to find something that does work, teachers use
the kind of teaching that enabled them personally to learn; they rely on that which other teachers
have found to work; and they rely on that which seems to work with their students. For lack of
any better information, they are forced to continually "reinvent the wheel" (i.e., innovate) and
over the years the same innovations and the same faulty initiatives (uncharitably called "fads")
come around again and again--all at student and taxpayer expense.
In my opinion, teacher training further contributes to this situation by a) failing to train
prospective teachers in any experimentally vindicated approaches to teaching (that might be used
or adapted) or by b) affording such little training in a given approach that implementation is
almost bound to fail. From what I have seen over the years, well demonstrated teaching practices
have been neglected or abandoned because (inadequately trained teachers) could not make them
work (after having a few classes or a workshop). Over time, most teachers become so jaded about
the latest "innovation" that they understandably ignore new ideas regardless of merit.
Finally, developmentalist teacher training effectively encourages teachers to believe that
good teaching requires whatever approach they devise to be, first and foremost, well received by
students and, second, effective in producing academic achievement. This order of priorities is
more or less the reverse of the public's. Schools that fail to produce acceptable degrees of
conventional academic achievement are nonsense to the public. It is my suspicion that this
stricture combined with the uncertainty about whether an untested innovation will produce
results markedly limits that which teachers and schools are willing to attempt with students. In
other words, there is a boundary based on doctrine and effectively reorders educational priorities.
I might add that this is a terribly expensive way to go about education. Teachers are sent on a
perpetual quest for the perfect fit between teaching practice and the individual student's
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developmental attributes on the theory that an excellent fit will be both well received and
successful. Again, in my opinion, the public would prefer schooling that succeeds in producing
learning whether or not students find it entirely to their tastes.
(5) ...there being grounds besides "natural development" for advocating methods
other than those research has shown effective
I do not disagree. My point is that the "natural" attribute is important to the appeal of these
approaches, perhaps a critically important attribute. Neither am I arguing that all traditional or
unnatural approaches are effective.
(6) The first problem is that there is much published which seems quite clearly to be
flawed research, or interpretations of research, in that it does not isolate an
independent variable and show its effect.
Yes, there is plenty of flawed research--experimental and otherwise; and yes, it is difficult
to isolate the effects of independent variables in complex situations. However, I do not take these
considerable difficulties as arguments for abandoning experiments. Instead, I ask whether there is
better avenue to credible knowledge of teaching effectiveness.
It seems to me that teacher education and the teaching profession generally has some
obligation to assure that the skills with which teachers are equipped actually work. I think the
obligation is largely parallel to that had by medical schools and the medical profession.
Experimentally validated and field tested findings have enabled enormous advancements in
medicine and many other areas of human endeavor. That they would fail so completely in
education would be odd indeed.
My point here is that if the teaching profession has an obligation to equip teachers with
practices that work and that experiments are the best way of making such a determination, then
experimental evidence should play a prominent role in our thinking about how to teach. If we
reject experimentation on the grounds that it is less than perfect, it seems to an unfair
comparison--the perfect hypothetical is made the enemy of the best real option.
(7)*IF* you can make the practice fun, is that not better than making drill tedious --if
you achieve the same learning. Not better because it is more effective in the short
run, but because it may be more effective in the long run for students' schooling in
general, and is more humane. I am not against memorization, nor am I against drill.
The argument is over the specifics and the outcomes with regard to a reasonable
span of time. If you teach kids to read, but make them hate to read, what of value
have you accomplished?
I wholly favor making learning fun and interesting, and if students generally learned the
way Rousseau's Emile did, for example, the educational issues that concern us would be largely
nonexistent. It is worth remembering, however, that Rousseau's real children were shipped off to
an orphanage.
The point I am making is that in those cases where teachers find something that "clicks"
with the student, the resulting learning can be ideal. Your personal examples are great; and to all
who can find similarly thoughtful and creative ways of achieving results, I offer my
complements. The great problem of education, however, is what to do about the very substantial
numbers of students who do not respond.
My question is: Must teachers be limited to methods that are immediately gratifying and
well received by students? I am suggesting that developmentalism, in effect, sets such a limit. As
would be true of any reasonable and humane individual, I favor the most gratifying methods we
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can devise and I certainly would exclude intervention that goes beyond the bounds of decent and
humane treatment. Where I probably would part company with many members of the teaching
profession, however, is that I would balance the privations attendant a student's effort during his
or her school years against the catastrophic prospect of failure to learn. Learning takes study
(defined broadly) and study takes time and effort. Almost inevitably in our day and age, study
time comes at the expense of some far more attractive activities. Either children discipline
themselves to the task as a result of the enthusiasm inspired by their teacher or the teacher (and
the parent) somehow insure that the necessary time and effort is allocated. To me, letting children
become much less than they can be is truly abusive.
Another area in which I would part company with many teachers and teacher educators is
in the matter of how patient we should be in expecting students to progress. I think that
individuals whom I would term developmentalists see time and expected progress as largely open
ended. My view is that time is money and there are finite limits to both. Schools are enormously
expensive. When college level remedial programs have to re-teach basic skills to high school
graduates (even ones with above average GPAs), I think we need to take a careful look at
whether students are making good use of the educational opportunity they are provided.
Schooling is plenty expensive even without waste. Permitting students to advance without
learning wastes their time as well as the taxpayer's money. What we know as adults is that there
is only a brief period in one's life when one's parents provide a place to live and pay the bills.
Sooner or later most people are on their own; and as many of the students I see every day will tell
you, they wished their parents and their teachers had pushed them while the opportunity was
there.
In addition to believing that many in teaching fail to balance present deprivation and
discomfort against the catastrophic effects of failure to learn, I think the supposed dangers of
teaching practices to which students are not immediately receptive is greatly overrated--a point I
tried to address in the present paper. My two sons dislike wind sprints in basketball practice, but
such activities do seem to get them ready for play and neither one of them have talked about
quitting basketball. As an educational psychologist, I would argue that people frequently learn
valuable lessons under adverse circumstances. They may strongly dislike the experience that
taught them, but knowledge or skill acquired became valuable and attractive because of its
functionality under other circumstances. For example, many people hate English composition
classes but later learn to love writing.
In truth, structured and result-oriented teaching methods are not inherently unpleasant. For
example, Direct Instruction (Engelmann, Becker, Carnine, et al) entails drill, recitation, and
choral responding--all practices that are anathema to many educators. Kids, however, seem to
love it.
(8) When Stone says "Led by Dewey...the mainstream teaching profession has held
that such 'intrinsic' or naturally occurring interest will express itself provided that the
student is confronted with a sufficiently meaningful or relevant or lifelike problem"
Stone seems to think that this precludes all sorts of what he refers to as "purposeful
actions of teachers and parents".
I must not have made myself clear on this point. In my view, Dewey does not restrict all
purposeful actions of teachers and parents, rather he limits their options to approaches that would
pique a youngster's interest. My reading of Dewey is that his great break with educational
tradition of his day was his insistence that true learning had to be motivated by the genuine
interest of the student, not by the insistence of a teacher/taskmaster. For example, Dewey would
have opposed a teacher insisting that an unengaged student complete an assignment before going
to recess. In fact, Dewey would have objected to the idea of the teacher making an assignment
purely on the basis of the teacher's assessment of the student's educational needs.
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I realize my responses are not as complete and as nuanced as your contentions deserve, but
for the time being this is the best I can do. Again, I appreciate your thoughtful response because I
believe this issue may be at the heart of whether public schools as we know them survive.
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Thanks to Rick Garlikov for taking the time to respond to John Stone's
"Developmentalism" article. Among the good qualities of Rick's response is that it is an
illustration of how to follow the Edpolicy Guidelines! I hope all who took the time to read
Stone's article will also take the time to read Rick's response (the response is only about
one-quarter as long!). My purpose in this post is to branch off from both of them to follow the
question, "In any given situation, just WHAT is being taught?" In the direct instruction lessons I
have observed, myself or via videotape, I was convinced that the overriding outcome, the one
that would last (if anything did) was, "Do what the teacher says, believe what the teacher
believes; don't think too much because it will slow you down."
YES--I know that is not what most instructors intend. I know that is not all that happens.
But I have been convinced by the tasks and the methods that it is mainly what happens. Rick's
example of Saxon math and the follow-up questions illustrates my point. No teacher can take the
questions seriously and keep to the essence of direct instruction; nor should they, any more than
whole language teachers should avoid word/sound correspondences. My question, "What is
taught?", however, came from Rick's "statistics" example. I put in the quotation marks because I
argue that Rick's 100-box problem does not teach statistics in any meaningful sense of the term. I
will argue that it teaches, "None of the most important and difficult problems in life are
statistical, but sometimes you can use statistics to understand them better, maybe even solve
them". Here is the task, as set out in Rick's response to Stone:
"Likewise, here is a statistics question that might work better to help teach statistics. I
have been trying to work out ways to get kids to see that one must take into account not only
probabilities, but the value of outcomes, when assessing choices. For example, should you play a
game where you get to choose a box to open if there are 100 boxes to choose from, $1000 in each
of 99 of the boxes, but a bomb that will be fatally detonated in one of the boxes? If kids say, "yes,
because those are good odds", I lower the amount of money in each box, which does not change
the odds, but which starts to make them reconsider, and get the point.
My stats question derives from different variations on this game: Is there any difference
between having 100 kids who think this is a good game to play each choose a box (all at the
same time, so that all the boxes are spoken for), and having 100 kids play the game separately?
Why or why not?" (Rick goes on to explain...) "If they play simultaneously one kid will for sure
get killed, which seems like it makes the game not a good game for any of them, since they will
be guaranteed to lose a friend, if not their own life. But if they play individually (with different
sets of boxes, replacing the chosen box each time), maybe no one will get killed, and maybe two
or eight or 100 of them will be killed. Yet the game may still seem like a good risk to some kids
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to play on this basis. IS THERE a statistical difference between the two ways of playing the
game? If so, what? And if not, why does it seem okay to play it one way to a kid but not another
way? This is the sort of thing I consider to be a purposeful interventionist, proactive sort of
teaching question, but one which is consistent with Dewey and which would perhaps lead to
students learning about statistical analysis better. Yes? No? It is not a "natural" question, but one
which I think is of the sort that works "naturally" to get kids more interested and thinking about
statistics issues and more readily receptive to learning them, however else they are taught."
My point: Except for the first, simple situation (one person choosing one box from 100),
people I know (from 'kids' to graduate students), cannot or will not learn enough probability to
arrive at the correct odds themselves. Even if they arrive at an intuitive acceptance of the odds as
stated by the teacher, the crucial question remains, "How do you put a value on human life?"
Even as a class exercise, this belongs in Decision Theory, and here again, "kids" and graduate
students I know will not gain more than an exceptionally superficial feeling for the "statistics". If
the teacher can engage their interest, however, they WILL see how crucial the value question is
and how, IF they can answer that question THEN they can apply some simple statistics to arrive
at an answer. My prediction is that most people will decide that they should not play the game at
all, any more than they would play Russian roulette. If you really want to teach statistics, there
are, IMHO, better examples, e.g., error estimates in opinion polling, bias resulting from
non-random sampling in comparative studies.
Here is an example from the National Pilot Mathematics Test, elementary school, in the
U.K., 1992. (The 'sign' was presented in a box so it looked like a sign. Use of a calculator was
allowed. 'lift' = 'elevator')
--------------------------------------------------------------------

This is the sign in a lift at an office block:
This lift can carry up to
14 people
In the morning rush, 269 people want to go up in this lift.
How many times must it go up?
--------------------------------------------------------------------The expected answer is 20, but notice how many assumptions are required for this to be
correct (always full when people waiting, no one takes the stairs, no large parcels...). The best
approach is to assume maximum simplicity, divide 269 by 14 and round up, still not an easy
question for young people. But what is being assessed? What is being taught? The example
appeared in the article by Patricia Murphy (1995), "Sources of inequity: understanding students'
responses to assessment" (Assessment in Education, 2(3), 249- 270), where she presents
evidence that girls pay more attention to context than boys and hence take more time with this
task, maybe get it wrong, maybe omit it. Mathematics tests are full of such examples, and the
successful student has to learn to ignore most of the contextual information and get directly to the
simple calculations. Few would argue that mathematics teachers should be teaching this. Just one
more example of an item that might be authentic in some circumstances but not desirable in any:

Billy steals Joe's skateboard. As Billy skates away at 15 mph, Joe
loads his 357 Magnum. If it takes Joe 20 seconds to load his Magnum,
how far away will Billy be when he gets whacked?
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Best to end with another quotation from Rick's response: "I think teachers need to be able
to recognize and create teachable moments and then know what to do with them when they have
them." Right on, Rick.
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While I believe Prof. Stone's analysis correctly characterizes and chastises the views and
(often mistaken) pedagogical philosophical understanding of some teachers and school districts
with which I am familiar, I think it (1) does not sufficiently explain or take into account the
rationales, and philosophical points, of other people for some of the approaches he refers to as
"developmental", (2) does not fully appreciate some of the objections to experimentally
demonstrated teaching methods, and (3) relies in crucial places on an ambiguity or vagueness in
what it means for a teaching/learning method to be "natural" --a concept he argues is central to
"developmentalist" philosophy. While that concept may be central, it seems to me that his
objection to its involvement in pedagogical philosophy depends effectively only on one sense of
what it means to learn something "naturally", and not on a different, more important sense. While
I do appreciate Prof. Stone's distinction between "educationally appropriate" instruction and
"developmentally appropriate" instruction, I think more needs to be said about what that means. I
also believe that his paper makes some extremely important points and is substantially correct
about the way many teachers and administrators conceive of what they are doing. This response
is meant more as a supplement than an attack. My chief concern in writing this is that the good
aspects of some of the approaches Prof. Stone considers "developmental" not be thrown out with
those elements he effectively argues are bad.
First, as I have written repeatedly on AERA-C and EDPOLYAN, *I* believe it is wrong
not to teach students in some way far more actively than just letting them discover things on their
own as they happen to come to them. Pat Clifford used an expression I liked when she asks of
teachers who let students work things out on their own whether they are doing anything "other
than hosting the event". As I have put it, it would likely take students collectively 5000 years if
they had to discover on their own what civilization has discovered collectively in the last 5000
years. Surely the point of "teaching" is to somehow more efficiently pass on to others the learning
that is otherwise painfully slow to come about. The issue is what the most effective, and best,
means of doing that is -- where what is "best" may involve elements other than mere
effectiveness. So none of what I write below is meant in any way to imply or say that I think
children should not be actively taught things they may not come to on their own. And while I
believe it is helpful for students to be ready to learn what you are teaching, I believe an important
element of teaching is purposefully "making" or getting them ready.
Second, I did not come to my ideas about education by training in education schools, so
none of the (methods) books Prof. Stone mentions as being potentially influencing had any effect
on me DIRECTLY. The possible exception is Dewey, some of which I have read; but I read
Dewey after most of my educational ideas were already formed, and tended to either agree or
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disagree rather than, I think, simply being influenced or inculcated. As Prof. Stone says, however,
there is no way to tell how much indirect influence Dewey or others before me may have had on
my thinking.
Third, MY criticism of schools is not "their continuing failure to equip students with the
academic and workplace skills needed in an era of increasing economic competition." My
personal view is that there are far more efficient ways of doing this than school, and that the
purpose of school is to give students a broader range of knowledge and skills than whatever the
workplace may likely demand, so that they can do well in life as well as work, and so that they
themselves can bring about important changes in society and the workplace rather than just being
able to adjust to those changes. Plus, I take the view that learning things is a great thing, often
just because they are interesting to learn -- whether they have any known application at the time
or not. Too much of great importance has been discovered just because people followed "idle"
curiosity or interests instead of spending their time learning what was already known to be
useful, to make school just be a place where information that is known to be applicable at the
work place is taught.
In those places where schools do not teach well enough to adequately prepare students for
the workplace, that signifies a problem on my view only because that should be a minimal
outcome of the sort of education I seek for students. But the problem may not be solely that of
the schools' in those cases, or at least not of the teachers in those schools. It may be a larger
social problem, even in affluent suburban school districts.
Prof. Stone says that developmentalism is a "doctrine that pervades teacher education and
one that disposes the teaching profession to favor certain practices and to ignore others regardless
of empirically demonstrated merit." My understanding from reading, discussion, and from
personal experience is that teachers (like anyone else) are disposed to favor specific practices
with which they are familiar and comfortable -- frequently teaching as they have been taught,
rather than teaching as they have been taught to teach in ed schools -- and that any practice which
differs from what they are comfortable with is difficult to get them to accept on the basis of ANY
kind of theory, whether overt or underlying. I have even found that you can demonstrate a
method to teachers which is consistent with any philosophy of education they may have and still
NOT get them to adopt that method in their own teaching. I did one lesson with a third grade
classroom one time that worked out so much better than any teachers thought possible (and even
better than I thought likely) that the teacher's mouth literally dropped open as kids were
answering questions and making inferences that all the teachers and administrators had said was
impossible for them to do. Yet the teacher's understanding of what had happened was not about
the method, but about how good *I* was. NOTHING I could do or say convinced her she could
do the same thing using the method.
Further, it took many of the theories, such as whole-language, a lot of "promotion and
selling" to win acceptance at all; so I am not quite ready to accept that teachers have some
underlying disposition to accept the approaches Prof. Stone refers to as developmentalist (in what
might be facetiously referred to some sort of conspiracy theory of developmentalism in
education). I think salesmanship, whether based on merit or not, is perhaps more important than
(underlying) philosophy or demonstrated effectiveness.
With regard to (1) above --there being grounds besides "natural development" for
advocating methods other than those research has shown effective:
I am familiar with the rationales of some math constructivists and some whole language
advocates. I have read Constance Kamii (who worked with Piaget) and frequently discussed her
writing with her, and I have read some of the Goodman's works on whole-language. Their claims
are that just knowing algorithms in the case of math, and just being able to PRONOUNCE words
out loud is not the same thing as understanding or doing math, or as reading. They are not
making claims about what is natural, but about the ultimate ineffectiveness of certain kinds of
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direct instruction that have SEEMED to work, but which they argue have failed, or at least failed
large numbers of students. I won't go into the validity of their evidence here, but the point is their
argument is quite different from anything about what is natural.
Now Dr. Kamii in some cases does seem to make the further claim that children
CANNOT learn certain things before certain ages; but at other times she backs off from that and
says that the direct methods often used in schools DO NOT teach children, even though children
can be trained to perform certain tasks that make them look like they are doing math. She and I
differ quite frequently about what children have learned and what they understand, and how to
tell. But that is a very different matter from her having some sort of disposition toward what is
"natural". And we both agree that direct methods of teaching math traditionally do not help kids
understand it, though we have different evidence for that conclusion.
As to reading, even the "Hooked on Phonics" adds showing kids pronouncing big words
makes it fairly clear that they are not reading with any comprehension. And many elementary
school teachers can point to cases where students can pronounce even familiar words from a page
of print without having any understanding of what they mean in the context of "decoding them
from print". I have constructed such a phonetic example for adults, where the person reading it
out loud does not know what he is reading, but anyone listening to him will understand it
perfectly. Further, although SOME practitioners think teaching via whole language means they
are not supposed to teach any sound-symbol correspondence, the whole language approach as I
have read about it and heard it advocated, DOES espouse the teaching of sound- symbol
correspondence as necessary but not sufficient for teaching reading. But moreover, even teaching
sound-symbol correspondence is done in a way different from mere drill. There is a difference
between practice and drill in teaching anything, and I will get to that in a moment.
The references to "natural learning" that I have seen in Whole Language tracts have been
merely to point out that it is possible to learn to read without certain kinds of drill and
"instruction" just as we learn to talk without drill and "instruction" (other than the kinds of things
parents do sort of "naturally" in "teaching" kids to talk or teaching them particular words). I don't
remember reading anything that argued teaching reading in this way was better because it was
natural, just that it was possible. The "better" had to do with other sorts of claims.
(2) Objections to experimentally demonstrated teaching methods: Prof. Stone says "The
object of experimental research is to demonstrate the impact of an independent variable as an
agent of change." This gives rise to two different kinds of problems for a practitioner, one of
which Stone thinks is irrelevant, but which I want to try to give more force. The first problem is
that there is much published which seems quite clearly to be flawed research, or interpretations of
research, in that it does not isolate an independent variable and show its effect. Recently on
AERA-C Barak Rosenshine, himself, raised the issue of why the evidence for direct instruction,
etc. was ignored by so many people. He pointed to research and claims about the Saxon direct
instruction teaching in math. As the discussion progressed, someone posted a sample lesson from
a Saxon math textbook. The lesson included a number of questions after the text or explanatory
part. It seemed quite clear to me that the nature of the questions was extremely important for
fostering understanding and for any application other than mere memory in closely similar
circumstances. (And my argument is that you can only memorize so much math; and if that is the
way you learn it, you will be much more limited in your math ability than if you understand it
AND can do much automatically from practice.) I told Barak that I would be very surprised if
Saxon math books WITHOUT the questions could yield anywhere near the same test results the
Saxon math books as they are WITH the questions did. But THAT experiment has not been
done. The point is that "direct instruction" is not an isolated independent variable in whatever
studies were done on the Saxon method. So that even if the Saxon method is a good method for
teaching math (which it seems to be, according to Barak), that does not show "direct instruction"
is what is the key element for math instruction or for the Saxon method. The problem in general
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is that in any complex situation such as a classroom, it is very difficult to isolate variables and
test them with controls, even if one does this through various meta-analyses simply statistically.
Second, I assume Prof. Stone would not advocate use of drugs or electric shock therapy if
these were shown by research to drastically increase learning. What is sought in schools is
effective teaching that is also not Draconian in some way. The argument against some forms of
drill (and drill alone) is that it IS Draconian, not physically as drugs or electrical shock would be,
but in other important ways, primarily in its killing all interest in the subject so that whatever is
gained in the short run by making kids drill is lost in the long run by their never wanting to take
any more math, or read any more books, than they have to in order to get a grade. It is not that
drill is conceived of as bad because it is unnatural, but that it is conceived of as bad because it is
ultimately counterproductive to learning though it may help kids who work in stores count
change back better.
I would argue that drill in things which are unimportant (e.g., learning state capitals in
alphabetical order of states) is bad because it takes time away from learning more useful things
(even if they also are memorized) and because it makes kids lose interest in school, since it is a
place where "stupid stuff", or stuff to be done in stupid ways, is arbitrarily assigned for no good
reason. Further, as I said, drill is different from practice; and there are lots of ways to give
practice without doing mere drill. For example playing "21" or Blackjack gives plenty of crucial
adding/subtracting practice. Playing team "War" with cards, where pairs of opponents turn over
pairs of cards, and the higher pair sum wins the opponent's cards, gives addition practice.
*IF* you can make the practice fun, is that not better than making drill tedious --if you
achieve the same learning. Not better because it is more effective in the short run, but because it
may be more effective in the long run for students' schooling in general, and is more humane. I
am not against memorization, nor am I against drill. The argument is over the specifics and the
outcomes with regard to a reasonable span of time. If you teach kids to read, but make them hate
to read, what of value have you accomplished? If you teach kids lower level math skills in such a
way that they hit the wall in algebra, what of value have you accomplished? Research that is
important is research that will take into account these longer term issues, not just tell which
methods help 3rd graders add or subtract the fastest and most accurately. This is not an issue
about "development"; it is an issue about what gives the best results, where results are not
narrowly construed.
Now there will be disagreement about WHICH things need to be learned automatically,
but that is a different issue. E.g., Bernice Wolfson and I used to argue about the point of teaching
multiplication tables. I say it is crucial so that you can have more chance at recognizing potential
common denominators when working with fractions, and more chance at solving algebra
problems that require factoring, etc. If you cannot readily see these things, you may not even
think of the right method for solving a problem, let alone not be able to do the actual calculations
very well. She had her own ways of doing multiplication and had never learned the multiplication
tables. But she did not go on to higher level math, and she admittedly took forever to multiply in
her head or on paper. She thought that was sufficient; I thought it deficient, and that she had
perhaps missed a lot of neat stuff because of her inability to automatically recognize
combinations involving multiples.
(3) What "natural" teaching methods are:
There is an ambiguity here that is important. In the medical example Stone gives ("The
artificial creation of immunities through the use of 'unnatural' and invasive vaccination is an
historic example."), such vaccines are only unnatural in that they may not occur in nature (in the
amounts needed for vaccinating everyone -- since cowpox virus did exist in nature), but they
work by using the body's quite natural response to invasive molecules. So, although polio vaccine
is "unnatural", the way it works is not.
When Stone says "Led by Dewey...the mainstream teaching profession has held that such

4 of 6

'intrinsic' or naturally occurring interest will express itself provided that the student is confronted
with a sufficiently meaningful or relevant or lifelike problem" Stone seems to think that this
precludes all sorts of what he refers to as "purposeful actions of teachers and parents". I don't see
this. I don't see that if I get kids to play "21" that is somehow different in terms of purposeful
action on my part from trying to make them do worksheets for a grade. One might even make a
game out of the worksheets. The point is not whether the teacher is doing anything invasive or
unnatural or purposeful, but whether whatever the teacher is doing is more likely to induce
learning. If you can INDUCE learning to occur naturally, that is quite different from waiting for
learning to occur naturally.
Now, SOME teachers do nothing (but "host the event") when they teach, but surely that is
not what Dewey meant for teachers to do. Am I being less instructive or less purposeful or more
"natural" when I tell a kid "if you play in the street and get hit by a car, it will squash you in the
same way you squash a bug with your shoe; and you will be just as dead as the bug" and the kid
UNDERSTANDS that, than if I say "I'll spank you if you go near the street to play." I say the
former may be much more effective with some kids at some times; and it is not less purposeful or
more intervening than the latter. And it is consistent with what Dewey was describing. Likewise,
here is a statistics question that might work better to help teach statistics. I have been trying to
work out ways to get kids to see that one must take into account not only probabilities, but the
value of outcomes, when assessing choices. For example, should you play a game where you get
to choose a box to open if there are 100 boxes to choose from, $1000 in each of 99 of the boxes,
but a bomb that will be fatally detonated in one of the boxes? If kids say, "yes because those are
good odds", I lower the amount of money in each box, which does not change the odds, but
which starts to make them reconsider, and get the point. My stats question derives from different
variations on this game: Is there any difference between having 100 kids who think this is a good
game to play each choose a box (all at the same time, so that all the boxes are spoken for), and
having 100 kids play the game separately? Why or why not? If they play simultaneously one kid
will for sure get killed, which seems like it makes the game not a good game for any of them,
since they will be guaranteed to lose a friend, if not their own life. But if they play individually
(with different sets of boxes, replacing the chosen box each time), maybe no one will get killed,
and maybe two or eight or 100 of them will be killed. Yet the game may still seem like a good
risk to some kids to play on this basis. IS THERE a statistical difference between the two ways of
playing the game? If so, what? And if not, why does it seem okay to play it one way to a kid but
not another way? This is the sort of thing I consider to be a purposeful interventionist, proactive
sort of teaching question, but one which is consistent with Dewey and which would perhaps lead
to students learning about statistical analysis better. Yes? No? It is not a "natural" question, but
one which I think is of the sort that works "naturally" to get kids more interested and thinking
about statistics issues and more readily receptive to learning them, however else they are taught.
The notion of what is natural, developmentally appropriate, interventionist, or
"constructivist" is not clear. I have presented NCTM with a socratic method that I say gets kids to
understand "place-value" in math, and they say it is nothing but a prescription for teaching; and
they reject it. I say it takes thought and skill and art and understanding to use the method
properly; they say it doesn't. I say it shows kids understand place- value; they say kids only give
the answers I am prompting. I say those answers can't be prompted without the kids'
understanding.
The point is that there is no clear cut distinction between what is natural and what is
purposeful intervention in the way that either constructivists or Stone seem to think. And
sometimes it is not clear what is intrinsic or extrinsic. If my students just don't like me, than they
may not respond interestedly to my above stat problem; if they do, they may. There is an element
of the extrinsic in making something interesting perhaps.
Isn't the real issue trying to avoid the Draconian or the harmful, and also finding what is
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most effective in a way that does not have some kind of harmful "side-effects"? What is the point
of trying to argue whether a method is teacher directed or not? Surely that is irrelevant. But on
the other hand, my experience indicates to me that if you can get students to see the point of a
procedure or exercise, or if you can make it interesting in some way (or not kill interest in it),
then whatever other sort of instruction you need to use to help or get them to learn it, will work
better. I just don't see any of this as an either/or sort of thing for most subjects.
In quoting Armstrong, Stone says with disapproval that "many teachers have come to
believe teaching is more art than science". There are important "art" aspects to teaching. One of
these is figuring out what kids already know that might help them learn new concepts better. One
of these is figuring out what kids do know or just seem to know, or don't know/understand at all
AFTER you have "taught" them. There is, after all, an art to communication in general. And one
of the art aspects of education is figuring out what you need to try to get the significance of what
you are teaching through to students. And one is being able to make something interesting to
students.
I write all this because I can't imagine that mere drill and mere lecturing and merely
holding the threat of a grade over a kid's head (or promising a reward) is the best way to teach
much even though it makes some short term gains in some cases; but on the other hand, I think
what Prof. Stone writes is true about too many teachers. And, like him, I don't think merely being
there to try to wait for readiness or that right teachable moment is the best way to teach anyone
anything. I think teachers need to be able to recognize and create teachable moments and then
know what to do with them when they have them.
One pet peeve: the holding of Benjamin Spock responsible for the permissive society.
What Spock advocated in Baby and Child Care was that babies did not need to be on a rigid
feeding schedule whereby they were given a certain amount of formula every four hours even
when not hungry and denied food when they displayed signs of hunger just because it happened
to be three hours or three hours and a half. Spock recommended firm discipline where it was
needed, but did not think (as I do not) that discipline for the mere sake of rigidity or arbitrary or
average scheduling was warranted. Surely recommending more flexible feeding times has not
undone our society.
Finally, I believe it is not age development that generally creates readiness, but
development through meaningful exposure or experience. I suspect that if you can expose kids to
things earlier in ways that are meaningful to them, you can teach kids a lot more than most
people suspect without "pressuring" them, and without thereby being "unnatural" in the sense of
cramming it down their throats.
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